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"[A] search against [the defendant's] car must be regarded as a
search of the car of Everyman."
--Justice Robert Jackson'
The Supreme Court's recent Fourth Amendment decisions have
drawn increasingly sharp criticism from the legal academy. Article after
article documents the Court's transgressions: how it has riddled the
Warrant Clause with exceptions, has suffocated individual privacy
through an all-encompassing reasonableness standard, and has extended
unprecedented powers to law enforcement agencies.2 If ever a united cry
of warning has been made that a basic civil liberty was in danger, this
chorus of law review laments is it.
3
1. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2. For a representative sampler from among the substantial body of writing that exists,
see, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the
Fourth Amendment, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 473, 475 (1991) ("Rather than mold a body of
reliable fourth amendment law, the Supreme Court has created a makeshift solution[,] ...
render[ing] amorphous case-by-case, fact-specific adjudications .... [leaving the] law
mired in confusion and contradiction." (footnote omitted)); Tracey Maclin, The Central
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 197, 201 (1993) ("[T]he
[Supreme] Court has ignored or distorted the history of the Fourth Amendment"); BrianJ.
Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73
Minn. L. Rev. 583, 587 (1989) ("[T]he entire course of recent Supreme Court fourth
amendment precedent ... is misguided and inconsistent with the spirit of the fourth
amendment"); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA
L. Rev. 1, 18 (1991) (describing Court's adherence to Fourth Amendment's warrant clause
as "[1]ip service"); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately
Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1173,
1195 (1988) (critiquing the "distortion in the [Supreme] Court's fourth amendment
balancing" tests); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the
Mischief of Camara and Teny, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 383, 383 (1988) ("Many of the court's
present fourth amendment ills are symptoms of its failure to meet ... basic challenges
presented by the fourth amendment's text.").
The most persuasive voice urging calm is that of Professor Stuntz, who has provided
alternative explanations more elegant than the Court's own reasoning as to why the
Court's Fourth Amendment decisions should not be viewed with undue alarm. See
William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44
Stan. L. Rev. 553, 587-89 (1992) (suggesting that group searches might be understood as
implicit bargains with search targets where government has alternative investigation
methods available or as searches that can be controlled by political checks); William J.
Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 Va. L. Rev. 881, 897-912 (1991)
(arguing that Court's decisions under Warrant Clause are more understandable if viewed
within context of available remedies and a concern with after-the-fact bias by judges
towards government in reviewing searches). For further discussion, see infra notes
221-225 and accompanying text.
3. If the impassioned nature of law review article and note titles is any reflection of
the depth of the academy's frustration, even the uninitiated can quickly sense the concern
by sampling some of the more dramatic titles inspired by the Court's Fourth Amendment
decisions. See, e.g., Bruce G. Berner, The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth
Amendment, 25 Val. U. L. Rev. 383 (1991); Daniel J. Capra, Prisoners of Their Own
Jurisprudence: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Cases in the Supreme Court, 36 Vill. L. Rev.
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Yet a curious thing has happened. Apart from this chorus of aca-
demics, an occasional civil liberties lawyer, and a disenchanted judicial
dissenter or two, the warning largely has gone unheard and unheeded by
both the judiciary and the public at large. The politician on the stump is
far more likely to stir a crowd's passions by calling for an expanded "war
on crime" than by suggesting that greater restrictions on law enforcement
activities are necessary to preserve what, in the public's mind, are the
rights of accused criminals. More and more, the scholarly critics appear
to be an isolated band of constitutional purists, out of touch with reality,
trying to form a protective circle around the dying ember of the Fourth
Amendment based on the forlorn hope that, if jealously guarded, some
day a new theoretical and political wind might again fan it to life.
Perhaps, though, the problem is in part with the critiques of the
Court's Fourth Amendment decisions themselves. Generally, critics have
assumed that the factors which the Court uses to measure Fourth
Amendment reasonableness-privacy, intrusiveness, and government
need-are the proper ones to be weighed in deciding whether a warrant
is required or what level of suspicion must justify a search or seizure.
Consequently, most arguments have coalesced along the lines that the
Court has not properly measured the individual's expectations of pri-
vacy,4 that it has underemphasized the Warrant Clause's requirements of
a warrant based on probable cause,5 or that it has struck the wrong bal-
ance of individual and government interests in deciding that a particular
intrusion was "reasonable."6 Not surprisingly, therefore, proposed solu-
1267 (1991); Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v.
Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and
Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1991); Bradley W. Foster,
Warranfless Aerial Surveillance and the Right to Privacy: The Flight of the Fourth
Amendment, 56J. Air L. & Com. 719 (1991);James'F. Heuerman, Note, Florida v. Bostick:
Abandonment of Reason in Fourth Amendment Reasonable Person Analysis, 13 N. Ill. U.
L. Rev. 173 (1992); Craig S. Michalk, Case Comment, Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412
(1990): The Supreme Court's Latest Attack on Fourth Amendment Protections Against
Warrantiess Searches, 16 T. Marshall L. Rev. 333 (1991); William R. O'Shields, Note, The
Exodus of Minorities' Fourth Amendment Rights into Oblivion: Forida v. Bostick and the
Merits of Adopting a Per Se Rule Against Random, Suspicionless Bus Searches in the
Minority Community, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 1875 (1992); Victor C. Romero, Note, Whatever
Happened to the Fourth Amendment?: Undocumented Immigrants' Rights After
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 999 (1992); Christian J. Rowley, Note, Florida v. Bostick: The Fourth
Amendment-Another Casualty of the War on Drugs, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 601.
4. See, e.g., Serr, supra note 2, at 600-01; James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for
Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province,
36 Hastings L.J. 645, 735 (1985).
5. See, e.g., Bookspan, supra note 2, at 476; Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible
Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 257, 272-73 (1984).
6. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the
Government Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 669,
674-75 (1988); Strossen, supra note 2, at 1176; Sundby, supra note 2, at 400-04.
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tions have tended to focus on a more skilled and sensitive use of these
factors rather than a disagreement with the factors themselves.
7
The inability of these Fourth Amendment critiques to strike a re-
sponsive judicial or popular chord suggests, however, that their analyses
are missing a more deeply rooted and fundamental problem by asking
the wrong questions. What if the problem is not with judges improperly
doing their Fourth Amendment sums but with the factors themselves?
Might reliance upon privacy as the standard weight of the Fourth
Amendment no longer provide, by itself, an adequate measure for assess-
ing the propriety of government intrusions? Is making privacy the center-
piece of the debate over the "reasonableness" of a specific intrusion skew-
ing the very values the Amendment is designed to protect?
These are but some of the questions that must be asked if the cri-
tique of the Court's current Fourth Amendment tack is not simply to de-
generate into a shouting match over shades of reasonableness. What is
not needed at this juncture is another effort to explain why the Court is
being untrue to the Fourth Amendment of a past time when the Warrant
Clause was king. Unless the current legal and verbal framework for iden-
tifying Fourth Amendment values can be reconfigured, the future ap-
pears to hold little more than a Cassandra-like existence for those who
are dismayed by the Court's developing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
This Article makes an initial effort to reframe the Fourth
Amendment debate by exploring how the Court's current metaphor for
conceptualizing Fourth Amendment values, Justice Brandeis's famous im-
age of "the right to be let alone," no longer fully captures the values that
are at stake. The exploration begins with a brief examination in Part I of
the Court's current reliance on privacy analysis and a reasonableness bal-
ancing test as the primary means for delineating Fourth Amendment pro-
tections. Part II looks at the social, doctrinal, analytical, and rhetorical
reasons for why the current conceptualization of Fourth Amendment
protections, especially a reliance on "the right to be let alone" as the
Amendment's basic defining value, no longer adequately defines the
proper limits on government intrusions.
In Part III, after looking at how particular images or metaphors, such
as the First Amendment's marketplace of ideas, can influence public de-
bate and the development of legal doctrine, I argue for a new metaphor
for the Fourth Amendment to complement "the right to be let alone."
Drawing upon the values underlying the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, I suggest that the animating principle which has been ignored in
the current Fourth Amendment debate is the idea of reciprocal govern-
ment-citizen trust. This idea is explored further by looking at how a
number of the Court's recent Fourth Amendment decisions might differ
7. For a thoughtful attempt to recast the Court's current tests into a more rational
and focused inquiry, see Slobogin, supra note 2.
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if the Court focused not only on physical privacy but also on how govern-
ment intrusions affect the underlying need for government-citizen trust.
In the Conclusion, I answer some questions that might arise from
advocating the application of what appears to be such a lofty ideal-re-
ciprocal government-citizen trust-to government intrusions intended to
protect society from unlawful behavior. The reader will not be surprised,
I suspect, to learn that the Article concludes with the lesson that as press-
ing as societal scourges such as drugs and crime may seem, we also must
not lose sight of the long-term interest of maintaining a constitutional
system that is built upon the foundation of government-citizen trust.
I. THE CuRRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT: OF PRIVACY
AND REASONABLENESS
In 1928, at a time when the courts were facing a wave of Prohibition
Act cases not unlike the current flood of cases resulting from the war on
drugs,8 the Court confronted a situation where federal prohibition of-
ficers had placed wiretaps on the phones of a suspected bootlegging ring
without any pretense of obtaining a warrant.9 Adhering to a very literal
reading of the Fourth Amendment,' 0 the Court in Olmstead v. United
States held that the Amendment's protections did not apply because the
placing of the wiretaps had not required the officers to physically trespass
upon the defendants' premises."
The lasting legacy of Olmstead, however, would prove not to be the
majority's holding, but a rather remarkable dissent by Justice Brandeis.
Seizing the case as an opportunity to write a discourse on the need to
look to the values underlying the Constitution when defining rights, Jus-
tice Brandeis concluded that
[t]he makers of our Constitution... conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.12
Through this characterization of the Fourth Amendment's protections as
not merely a listing of physical property items that deserve protection
8. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Prohibition and the Fourth Amendment: A New Look
at Some Old Cases, 73J. Crim. L. & Criminology 471, 472 (1982).
9. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456-57 (1928).
10. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
11. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-66.
12. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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from government intrusion, but also as a means of reaching the far
broader goal of conferring "the right to be let alone," Justice Brandeis
articulated an underlying value in the form of privacy to which one could
look for guidance in determining the Amendment's scope.
Although it would take forty years,' 3 Justice Brandeis's view of the
Fourth Amendment became accepted by the Court in a later eavesdrop-
ping case, Katz v. United States.14  By declaring that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,"' 5 the Katz Court effectively tied
the Amendment's core meaning to the citizenry's "reasonable expecta-
tion[s] of privacy" 16 and made it possible, at least conceptually, 17 to ex-
tend the Amendment's scope to an array of government intrusions that
otherwise would not fall within the Amendment's literal meaning.
Embracing privacy as the Fourth Amendment's core value, however,
would have some unforeseen effects as well. One of the most significant
effects related to the Court's interpretation of the Amendment's proce-
dural protections. The Amendment's protections are found, of course,
in its two clauses: the Warrant Clause's requirement that "no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause" and the Reasonableness Clause's
more vaguely worded prohibition against "unreasonable searches and
seizures."' 8
Traditionally, the Court had emphasized the Warrant Clause as the
Amendment's "'cardinal principle ... subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions,' "19 and had used the
Reasonableness Clause as a means ofjustifying those exceptions based on
overriding necessities such as exigent circumstances.20 Thus, even
13. The Court, in Wolf v. Colorado, had stated that "[t]he security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police.., is at the core of the Fourth Amendment," 338
U.S. 25, 27 (1949), but it was not until Katz v. United States that privacy directly entered the
Fourth Amendment as part of a legal test. See 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). The emerging
influence of privacy analysis also could be seen in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-07
(1967) (rejecting "mere evidence" rule) and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72
(1966) (analyzing forcible blood tests under Fourth Amendment). See generally Note,
The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976), 76 Mich. L. Rev. 184, 191-96
(1977) (documenting emergence of Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine),
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
15. Id. at 351.
16. Id. at 360 (Harlan,J., concurring). Justice Stewart's majority opinion actually took
great pains to declare that he was not changing the Amendment into a "general
constitutional 'right to privacy,' ... [because its protections] often have nothing to do with
privacy at all." Id. at 350 (footnote omitted). That privacy would become the core value,
however, was preordained by Justice Harlan's concurrence, which coined the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test, id. at 360, and became the prevailing standard.
17. For an argument that the Court has been using privacy analysis in a way that
contracts the Fourth Amendment's applicability, see infra notes 28-39 and accompanying
text.
18. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
19. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 390 (1978) and Katz, 389 U.S. at 357) (footnotes omitted).
20. See Sundby, supra note 2, at 386-87.
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though in practice "these exceptions [to the Warrant Clause were] neither
few nor well-delineated,"2' almost all Fourth Amendment analysis was
channeled through the Warrant Clause's requirements of a warrant based
upon probable cause of misconduct.
The Court's introduction of the notion of privacy into the
Amendment as the means of defining the Fourth Amendment's applica-
bility, however, also created an opportunity to redefine the nature of the
Amendment's protections. After all, if privacy was relevant in determining
whether the Amendment even applied, should not privacy also be impor-
tant in deciding whether a government intrusion was reasonable under
the Amendment?
The Court took this next step of extending privacy analysis in Camara
v. Municipal Court22 and Terry v. Ohio.23 These cases made a Fourth
Amendment balancing test possible by formally recognizing privacy as the
counterweight that could be placed on the other side of the scale against
the government's interest in deciding whether a search was "reasonable."
As a result, a warrant based upon traditional probable cause increasingly
became but one option for the Court to choose depending upon how
strong the individual's privacy interest was compared to the government's
need for the intrusion.24 Although still an important part of the
Amendment, the conceptualization of the Fourth Amendment universe
as revolving around the Warrant Clause gave way to a view that "It]he
fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and
seizures be reasonable .... -25 And with this change in the focus of the
Amendment's protections, the door was opened for a variety of govern-
ment intrusions that lacked individualized probable cause under tradi-
tional Warrant Clause analysis but could now be approved if the Court
found that the government's need made the intrusion on privacy
"reasonable." 26
The Court's embracing of the "right to be let alone" as the animating
principle of the Fourth Amendment thus changed the nature of the
Court's analysis in a most fundamental way by making privacy the lodestar
for determining how and when the Amendment applied. But, intrigu-
ingly, a value that clearly was meant to liberate the Amendment from
wooden categorizations of Fourth Amendment interests also turned out
21. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468,
1473 (1985); see also id. at 1473-74 (documenting over twenty exceptions).
22. 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (applying Fourth Amendment to housing inspections based
on weighing of government's need against intrusion on privacy).
23. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (applying Fourth Amendment to stop and frisks based on
reasonable suspicion that individual was armed and dangerous).
24. The process of the Court's movement away from a Warrant Clause-centered
analysis is more fully developed in Sundby, supra note 2, at 391-404 (tracing how Camara
and Teny have changed definition and role of probable cause).
25. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
26. For a discussion of the Court's "special needs" test for departing from the Warrant
Clause, see infra notes 171-186 and accompanying text.
17571994]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
to contain the seeds for the later contraction of Fourth Amendment
rights. For what ultimately emerged was an Amendment that was privacy-
bound, rising or falling in both scope and protection based upon how the
notion of privacy fared in the Court and within society as a whole. And
with the benefit of hindsight, a number of factors can now be identified
that help explain why a Fourth Amendment founded almost exclusively
upon the principle of privacy is in decline.
II. PRIVACY'S FAILURE AS GuARDIAN OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The argument that formulating Fourth Amendment interests in pri-
vacy terms has undermined the Amendment's protections initially may
seern counterintuitive. One can easily imagine how a Court in a different
time might have taken the ideal of the "right to be let alone" and defined
privacy in a way that would have led to a very different Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence than that which exists today.27 However, a
coalescence of different factors-social, doctrinal, analytical, and rhetori-
cal-has prevented the vision underlying Justice Brandeis's words from
coming to pass. The "right to be let alone" no longer is capable of fully
protecting Fourth Amendment values.
A. Privacy in a Non-Private World
Perhaps most fundamentally, a Fourth Amendment based upon ex-
pectations of privacy must contend with the changing nature of modem
society. The very notion of a right to be left alone seems a bit tattered
once placed in the context of contemporary life. Justice Brandeis spoke
of the Fourth Amendment as guarding against unjustifiable intrusions
upon the private life of the individual in part out of a concern for en-
croaching technology.28 Even Justice Brandeis, though, could not have
fully envisioned the world of the 1990s, where the difference between
public and private largely has become blurred. Technological and com-
munication advances mean that much of everyday life is now recorded by
someone somewhere, whether it be credit records, banking records,
27. As one commentator has persuasively argued, the Warren Court's purpose in Katz
was not to limit the Amendment to privacy, but to broaden overall protections. Its failure
to articulate broader purposes, however, has allowed the expectations of privacy standard
to take over the Amendment. See John B. Mitchell, What Went Wrong with the Warren
Court's Conception of the Fourth Amendment?, 27 New Eng. L. Rev. 35, 47-53 (1992)
(arguing Court failed to adequately connect Katz test to broader societal values); see also
Lewis R_ Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 Ind. LJ.
549, 563-75 (1990) (arguing with detailed analysis that Court has departed from Katz's
intended meaning).
28. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far more
effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered
in the closet.").
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phone records, tax records, or even what videos we rent.29 We may want
to be left alone, but we realistically do not expect it to happen in any
complete sense. And perhaps it is worth noting that judges and legisla-
tors-the individuals who are primarily responsible for defining the
boundary between public and private for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment-especially have seen what once were largely thought of as
private affairs, like finances and marital matters, claimed as part of the
public's "right to know."
30
The fact that it has become increasingly difficult to find a Walden
Pond or "bee-loud glade" in today's world does not mean that privacy no
longer has a role within the Fourth Amendment; indeed, it may support
29. See generally Fred W. Weingarten, Communications Technology: New
Challenges to Privacy, 21 J. Marshall L. Rev. 735 (1988) (describing various technological
advances in communications field and analyzing their impact on legal and public policy
considerations regarding privacy);Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the
Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1395, 1397 (1987)
(proposing tort of violation of "information privacy"); David C. Esseks, Book Note, 87
Mich. L. Rev. 1624 (1989) (reviewing Richard F. Hixson, Privacy in a Public Society:
Human Rights in Conflict (1987)). One might recall that during Judge Robert Bork's
confirmation hearing for his nomination to the Supreme Court, a list of the videos he had
rented recently was reported by the media. See Stephen Advokat, Bork's Video Rentals
Become Privacy Issue, Chi. Trib., Nov. 20, 1987, § 7, at 106. The furor raised by the
publication eventually led to the passage of the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988,
§ 201(a), 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988); see also S. Rep. No. 599, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4341-45. (stating that Bork's embarrassment over
publication of video rentals was impetus behind Act).
30. Consider, for example, Justice Scalia's line of questioning during oral argument
'in the case of National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), in
which the Court considered the constitutionality of drug testing of Customs employees up
for promotion:
QUESTION [justice Scalia]: ... when we think of these privacy cases, I suppose
every federal judge thinks of the annual financial disclosures that every federal
judge has to file every year showing all income received by the judge and by his
spouse and children. Now, is your position that that is invalid or is there-
-some reason why that invasion of privacy, which is much greater because that
goes to the entire public, whereas these tests [of the employees] just go to-are
not published, of course. They don't become public.
If you're asking me to decide this on the basis of whether it's a greater invasion of
privacy that I should give a urine sample when I'm up for a promotion or a
transfer versus whether I should publish my entire financial background every
year, you're going to lose. [General laughter.]
MS. WILLIAMS [for petitioner]: That's right. That's why I would not make that
argument. [General laughter.]
184 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Constitutional Law, 1988 Term Supplement 803-04 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper
eds., 1990) [hereinafter Landmark Briefs and Arguments].
In addition to laws that require public disclosure of matters such as personal finances
or campaign contributions, other processes, such as confirmation hearings and
investigative reporting, result in close scrutiny of one's private life, as practically any
politician, judge, or would-be judge of recent memory can attest.
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all the more an argument for a stronger Amendment to protect what
enclaves of privacy are left. But this requires thinking of privacy in gen-
eral, abstract value terms, such that everyone, including the Court, would
agree that "privacy" is a cherished principle.3t However, under the
Court's current Fourth Amendment formulaic approach, privacy is not
invoked as an overarching value but rather is used as a specific fact to
assess whether and how the Fourth Amendment should apply to a given
intrusion. Such an approach asks, for example, whether the individual
has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in a particular activity, and, if
so, whether the government's need outweighs the scope of the privacy
intrusion. Privacy is thus treated as a quantifiable fact that can be used to
help resolve concrete legal disputes.
When used as a factual measure, reliance upon privacy as the center-
piece of Fourth Amendment rights actually creates the potential for less
overall privacy protection. This is true most simply because as govern-
mental and nongovernmental intrusions on privacy expand, the scope of
what one reasonably expects to be private correspondingly becomes trun-
cated. In other words, because the Court is not asking whether bank or
phone records should be kept private (thus invoking privacy as a value),
but, rather, whether we as a factual matter expect others to see and use
those records32 (thus viewing privacy as a measurable fact), Fourth
31. Usually, though, when the Court starts speaking of privacy in lofty terms, it is an
omen that the Court is about to explain why, despite privacy's cherished place, the search
or seizure in question was permissible. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968)
(noting that frisk was "serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict
great indignity and arouse strong resentment," but proceeding to uphold frisk on less than
probable cause); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (upholding forcible
blood test, but noting "[t]he integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our
society").
32. For example, in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the Court used factual
privacy to find that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in numbers dialed from
one's home because
[t] elephone users... typically know that they must convey numerical information
to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this
information; and that the phone company does in fact record this information
for a variety of legitimate business purposes. Although subjective expectations
cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that telephone
subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the
numbers they dial will remain secret.
Id. at 743. In dissent, Justice Marshall viewed privacy as an independent value because
"whether privacy expectations are legitimate... depends not on the risks an individual can
be presumed to accept when imparting information to third parties, but on the risks he
should be forced to assume in a free and open society." Id. at 750 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (concluding that no
reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records exists because "[t]he checks are not
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial
transactions. All of the documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit
slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their
employees in the ordinary course of business.").
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Amendment protections will shrink as our everyday expectations of pri-
vacy also diminish.
3 3
Likewise, to the extent the Court attempts to guard Fourth
Amendment privacy interests by looking to the degree of the govern-
ment's intrusion on privacy (the more intrusive the invasion, the greater
the government justification that is needed), the increased intrusions on
our everyday privacy will make any particular government action seem
less intrusive in comparison and thus require less of a justification.
34 If
an individual's privacy is already largely abrogated, any additional privacy
intrusions will appear to be only incremental by comparison.
The problem of how we use privacy to measure Fourth Amendment
rights is compounded by technological advances that have enabled the
government to invade privacy in a less physically intrusive manner. The
Norman Rockwell scene of Officer Friendly patrolling Main Street while
he whistles and twirls a nightstick has been replaced by drug-sniffing
dogs, urinalysis spectrometers, unmanned drones, heat sensors, DNA test-
ing, helicopter flyovers, and electronically tracked beepers. The question
is whether such technological "advances" will be used to further privacy
interests or to allow more incursions on the overall privacy of the
citizenry.
Certainly, such technological and resource-efficient techniques are
laudable to the extent they allow an already justified search to be con-
ducted in the least intrusive fashion possible. The use of advanced tech-
niques in this way serves privacy interests because a legitimate Fourth
Amendment search that otherwise would be conducted at a greater intru-
siveness level is in fact carried out at a lower level of intrusion. For exam-
ple, where a legitimate need to search for weapons exists, a metal detec-
tor will promote the privacy interest by achieving the government's
33. Indeed, the Court has made explicit that increased government regulation can
diminish the individual's Fourth Amendment privacy interest at stake. This reasoning
creates the ironic situation that the government intrusion challenged under the Fourth
Amendment can be responded to by pointing out how the government already greatly
intrudes upon the individual. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union, 489 U.S. at 672
(holding that customs agents by nature of job and regulation have lesser expectations of
privacy); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989) (holding
that pervasiveness of regulation of railway employees "diminished expectation of privacy");
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) ("These reduced expectations of privacy [in
vehicles] derive not from the fact that the area to be searched is in plain view, but from the
pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways."). But cf.
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 608 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (expressing
doubts about pervasive regulation as justification for warrantless search).
34. The problem might be thought of in terms of a mathematical metaphor: if the
numerator is the degree of the challenged government intrusion on privacy and the
denominator is the degree of all intrusions on individual privacy, as the denominator of
overall intrusions increases, the comparative value of the numerator's intrusion decreases.
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objective without subjecting the individual to a patdown and an opening
of packages.
3 5
The increasing tendency, however, is to use the lesser intrusion on
privacy as part of the justification for a government search that otherwise
would not be allowed.36 As a result, the Fourth Amendment's balancing
factors of privacy and the government's need for the intrusion become
viewed as dependent variables on a sliding scale: minimizing the level of
the privacy intrusion can help compensate for a weaker governmentjusti-
fication, such as one lacking individualized suspicion.37 Used in this ana-
lytical fashion, the government's ability to intrude in a less physically in-
trusive manner does not promote privacy interests but actually
undermines the overall right to be free from government surveillance by
expanding the scope of acceptable intrusions.38 A physical search of a
person for evidence of drug use while on the job, which normally would
require individualized suspicion, now becomes permissible if the govern-
ment uses minimally intrusive means (at least in a physical sense), such as
blood or urinalysis tests.39
35. See generally United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (addressing
reasonableness of airport screening procedures).
36. The lesser level of intrusion of a frisk as compared to a full search, for example,
was the Court's original entryway into the Reasonableness Clause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 29-31 (1968).
37. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1990)
(finding "objective" intrusion of sobriety checkpoint to be slight); New York v. Class, 475
U.S. 106, 118 (1986) (relying on "critical" issue of minimal intrusiveness to uphold entry
into car to check Vehicle Identification Number). Justice Powell in particular was aware of
how technological advances can skew Fourth Amendment inquiries, especially as to
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis. He objected in several cases that "Katz
measures Fourth Amendment rights by reference to the privacy interests that a free society
recognizes as reasonable, not by reference to the method of surveillance .... [Otherwise],
privacy rights would be seriously at risk as technological advances become generally
disseminated and available in our society." Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
251 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 223 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Reliance on the manner of
surveillance is directly contrary to... Katz. . . ").
38. AsJustice Brennan argued in objecting to the Court's use of minimal intrusion as
a factor in justifying immigration checkpoints:
The Court's view that "selective referrals-rather than questioning the
occupants of every car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment interests by
minimizing the intrusion on the general motoring public," stands the Fourth
Amendment on its head. The starting point of this view is the unannounced
assumption that intrusions are generally permissible; hence, any minimization of
intrusions serves Fourth Amendment interests. Under the Fourth Amendment,
however, the status quo is nonintrusion .... Thus, minimization of intrusion only
lessens the aggravation to Fourth Amendment interests; it certainly does not
further those interests.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 572 n.2 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
39. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624-28 (1989)
(relying in part on minimal intrusiveness of blood samples, breath tests, and urinalysis as
factors in upholding drug and alcohol testing of railway employees under certain
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By making privacy the central factor in the Fourth Amendment's
equation, therefore, the Court unwittingly introduced a factor that, over
the long term, resulted in an overall decline in the Amendment's protec-
tions. This situation will only worsen as the inevitable march of govern-
ment regulation further blurs the notion of what is private and as techno-
logical advances enable the government to invade privacy in more
pervasive, but physically less intrusive, ways.
B. The Decline of Liberalism and Individual Rights
Privacy has become problematic in Fourth Amendment doctrine not
only because our factual sense of privacy has diminished but also because
of a more general, growing skepticism about the assertion of individual
rights.40 Although a "counterrevolution" to the Warren Court's due pro-
cess revolution has not occurred in the sense that the Court has overruled
significant cases in a wholesale fashion, little doubt can exist that the orig-
inal revolutionaries' muskets largely have been silenced. Recent
Supreme Court rulings generally have been hostile to claims for new or
expanded rights and have demonstrated an intention of curbing what are
perceived to be the excesses of individual and group claims of constitu-
tional rights. This trend is especially evident where the claimed right is
against legislative use of power and where invalidating the action may
result in the Court being perceived as activist and operating like a
"superlegislature."4 1
circumstances); see also Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623, 634-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(finding "technology ... . an unsteady gauge" in determining scope of privacy right under
State Constitution, because if an "'ease of interception' standard were applied there
would be virtually no [protected] private communications. .. ").
40. One branch of this criticism is the traditional critique that the judiciary acts like a
superlegislature when it creates constitutional rights. See generally Robert H. Bork, The
Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990); Lino A. Graglia, The
Constitution and "Fundamental Rights," in The Framers & Fundamental Rights 86-101
(Robert A. Licht ed., 1992). A growing body of criticism, however, recently has focused on
the perceived adverse impact of the assertion of rights upon an effort to build a working
community of diverse viewpoints. The critique from this perspective is not so much
directed at courts creating implied rights, but at how an overly individualistic, simplistic,
and absolutist view of rights can impede efforts to develop a strong social fabric. See
generally Mary A. Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse
(1991). Recent controversies over attempts to regulate hate speech, for example, have
highlighted the potential tensions between a civil libertarian and an egalitarian or
communitarian view of individual rights. Compare Calvin 1L Massey, Hate Speech,
Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. Rev.
103, 173-74 (1992) (arguing that well-meaning efforts to suppress hate speech ultimately
undermine principles of self-government) with MariJ. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320, 2356-58 (1989)
(advocating prohibition of hate speech directed at historically oppressed groups).
41. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword:
The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43 (1989) (expressing disapproval of the
Rehnquist Court's "majoritarian" approach to judicial review). For an overview of the
Court's trend in the criminal procedure area, see Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren
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The significance of this retreat is particularly relevant for the Fourth
Amendment because one area where the Court has demonstrated partic-
ular wariness in expanding rights is with the general constitutional right
to privacy.42 Although the Fourth Amendment's privacy component has
a unique heritage distinct from Griswold v. Connecticut43 and its progeny,
the prevailing notion, at least in the Supreme Court, that privacy interests
have been pushed too far in barring democratically imposed limitations
seems to have infused attitudes towards Fourth Amendment privacy issues
as well. This skepticism of constitutional privacy claims is especially ap-
parent where the challenged government intrusion is not the classic po-
lice-criminal suspect encounter, but involves planned government intru-
sions without individualized suspicion. This latter type of intrusion-
such as a sobriety checkpoint or the taking of a urine sample-usually
does not involve the vivid physical specter of a body search or the police
bursting into the home. Consequently, arguments against the govern-
ment intrusion will necessarily invoke policy and value arguments that
resonate with general concerns over the government's right to impinge
on an individual's privacy and autonomy, concerns that are currently in
retreat on the broader constitutional landscape. 44
Whether a departure from focusing on individual rights is desirable
is a complex question. The benevolent impulse to expand the scope of
constitutional rights to enhance individual liberties might not necessarily
produce beneficial long-term results. Persuasive arguments can be made
that if every individual or group perceives itself as having rights to assert,
what results is a logjam of conflicting rights, leaving the courts in the
unenviable position of trying to resolve society's most difficult questions
by declaring certain parties "winners" and the other parties the "losers."45
Court and its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 23 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 591 (1990); Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1369 (1991).
42. See generally Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 Colum. L. Rev.
1431, 1450 (1992) (noting that "[t]he current members of the Supreme Court are haunted
by the specter of Lochner v. New York and the dreaded doctrine of substantive due process,
of which Grisold's progeny, especially Roe v. Wade, are suspected of being the modern
illegitimate descendants.").
43. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
44. The discounting of privacy interests can be seen both in the initial determination
of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists such that the Fourth Amendment
even applies, see discussion infra Part III.D.1, as well as in the Court's balancing in cases
such as Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-53 (1990) (discounting
.subjective" intrusion of checkpoints on motorists), National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671-72 (1989) (stating that "operational realities" of employment
diminish privacy expectations), and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 627 (1989) (viewing employees' privacy interests as diminished because of nature of
railway industry).
45. See generally Glendon, supra note 40, at 76-144 (discussing hazards of overly
rigid focus on individual rights upon citizen's sense of social responsibility).
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One can see the potential clash of rights in the Fourth Amendment
area as individual claims of privacy increasingly are met by "countertalk"
of a right to be free from crime.46 And if resolving a clash of rights is
simply a playing of each actor's rights card and deciding which right is
more valuable, the government's card representing the citizenry's "right"
to safety almost always will outweigh an individual's claim of a right to
privacy, especially where the intrusion can be characterized as minimal.
Consider, for example, how the rights cards compare when debating so-
briety checkpoints: which right is greater, society's right to safe highways
through the use of sobriety checkpoints or a right to be free from a brief
thirty-second encounter with the police? Cast in this way, (and one can
make the comparison even more skewed by suggesting that the individ-
ual's claimed right is in fact founded upon the "privilege" of driving),
little doubt can exist as to which rights card will triumph.
The lesson for those concerned with Fourth Amendment protections
is that playing the rights game as currently defined is bound to be a losing
proposition except in the most egregious cases. I do not mean to say that
individual liberties are no longer cherished principles, but simply that the
dialogue is changing and that a claim that one has a right is the begin-
ning and not the end of the legal conversation. 47 Whether captured in
the gentler rubric of communitarianism or the more strident tones of a
political argument that too many rights exist, the undeniable message is
that those calling for greater protection of a "right" had better be pre-
pared to explain how the protection benefits not only the individual
claimant but all of society.
C. The Move to a Reasonableness Balancing Test: Importing the Madisonian
Dilemma into the Fourth Amendment
If Fourth Amendment analysis had continued to rest primarily within
the Warrant Clause and its traditionally rigid requirements of a warrant
based upon individualized probable cause, the societal and doctrinal
changes described earlier might not have had such a great ripple effect.
But, as previously noted,48 embracing privacy as the Fourth Amendment's
defining concept also cracked the door open for greater use of a reason-
46. Consider, for example, President Clinton's argument in favor of broader police
powers: "There are many rights [guaranteed by] our Constitution... [b]ut [victims] have
certain rights we are letting slip away. They include the right to go out to the playground,
and the right to sit by an open window; the right to walk to the comer without fear of
gunfire; the right to go to school safely in the morning...." Gwen Ifill, Clinton Asks Help
on Police Sweeps in Public Housing, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1994, at Al, A18.
47. A rethinking of landmark opinions similar to the one suggested by this Article is
also occurring in other areas of constitutional law. Professor Seidman, for example, has
made the provocative argument that Brown v. Board of Education and Miranda v. Arizona,
although producing short-term gains, may have in the long run defused more promising
reform movements. See Louis M. Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 673, 680
(1992).
48. See generally supra Part I.
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ableness balancing test by giving the Court an identifiable weight to bal-
ance against the government's interest.
The door has since been flung wide open, as the Court has made
clear that the bottom-line Fourth Amendment test is whether the govern-
ment intrusion is "reasonable" based upon a balancing of the govern-
ment's need to engage in the intrusion against the individual's privacy
interests. 49 This shift in focus from the Warrant Clause to a generalized
reasonableness inquiry, in turn, has changed the nature of Fourth
Amendment dialogue by gradually, but inevitably, fostering an increased
deference to the government's judgment that the challenged intrusion is
needed. This increased deference is not very mysterious once one com-
pares the different nature of the inquiries that each clause requires.
When the Warrant Clause still ruled the Fourth Amendment,50 the
judicial inquiry was basically a factual one: did adequate individualized
suspicion exist to establish probable cause, and, if so, was a warrant ob-
tained or an adequate excuse shown? Even conceding that ajudge's pol-
icy concerns may influence her factual findings, the government's ability
to justify the intrusion depended upon external factors beyond its con-
trol, namely the specific facts surrounding the particular search or
seizure.51 If undertaken without adequate individualized suspicion, a
49. Thus in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Court stated that while
"as a general matter," a warrant based on probable cause is required,
the longstanding principle [is] that neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor,
indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component
of reasonableness in every circumstance .... [O]ur cases establish that where a
Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special government needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's
privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is
impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the
particular context.
489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 619-20 (1989)); see also NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337, 342 n.8 (1985).
50. The gradual transition to a reasonableness-based Fourth Amendment inquiry can
be traced back to the Court's decisions in Camara v. Municipal Court and Teny v. Ohio. See
supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (describing transition). Prior to that time,
although not always a model of consistency, the Court generally had insisted that the
Warrant Clause was the primary source of Fourth Amendment protections. See
Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 282-83 (describing how Court arrived at "conventional
interpretation" that Warrant Clause is dominant clause).
As Telford Taylor's excellent historical look at the Amendment points out, the Court's
emphasis on the warrant requirement arguably is at odds with how warrants were actually
used and perceived at the time of the Bill of Rights. Taylor marshals a strong argument
that since warrants bestowed immunity upon their holder, the Warrant Clause was meant
to limit when warrants could issue and was not intended to encourage their use as the
Court has assumed. See Telford Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation
28-29, 41-43 (1969). Whatever the wisdom of adhering to the historical understanding of
the Warrant Clause, see discussion infra part III.D.4, the Court's twentieth-century
interpretation clearly has revolved around the Warrant Clause's requirements.
51. In Katz v. United States, for example, all of the Justices seemed to agree that the
government agents had acted "with restraint," but the Court steadfastly refused to sanction
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search or seizure to which the Warrant Clause applied could not be re-
deemed through policy arguments as to why the intrusion should have
been allowed anyway or by a broad appeal to societal approval of the
government's actions. In other words, the need to reconcile the
Madisonian dilemma that haunts most constitutional decisionmaking-
that "democratic majorities enjoy the fundamental right to rule as they
desire, while... individuals receive protection from majoritarian interfer-
ence in particular spheres"52-did not directly arise. The Warrant Clause
unambiguously took the decision away from the sphere of majority rule
and stated that no search could occur without meeting certain specific
factual predicates.5
5
This approach changed, though, once the Court began entertaining
"exceptions" and modifications to the Warrant Clause that went beyond
the immediate exigency requirements of a particular search or seizure.
Now, policy judgments began to filter into the Fourth Amendment
calculus. Camara v. Municipal Court54 illustrates the change that occurs in
the nature of the inquiry when one moves from a probable cause stan-
dard based on individualized suspicion to a standard that considers policy
questions:
In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable-
and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to is-
sue a warrant for that inspection-the need for the inspection
must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code
enforcement.
[.. T]here can be no ready test for determining reason-
ableness other than by balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails.55
And once the express weighing of government and privacy interests had
found a foothold in the Warrant Clause for so-called administrative
searches as in Camara, it was only a matter of time before the
the search since it had not met the Warrant Clause's factual prerequisites. See 389 U.S.
347, 356-57 (1967).
52. David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641, 644 (1994).
53. For example, Dunaway v. New York recognized that
the protections intended by the Framers could all too easily disappear in the
consideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by
different cases, especially when that balancing may be done in the first instance
by police officers .... A single, familiar standard is essential to guide police
officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the
social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they
confront.
442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979) (citation omitted).
54. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
55. Id. at 535-37.
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"reasonableness" balancing test would be applied to a variety of searches
under the Reasonableness Clause as well.
5 6
This shift from a factual probable cause inquiry to a reasonableness
analysis, in turn, started into motion two significant changes in Fourth
Amendment analysis that will have a lasting impact. First, it has affected
who-the citizen or the government-primarily controls the right to in-
trude. When factual probable cause is the core regulating device of gov-
ernment behavior, the Amendment is basically self-regulating because
control over the government's ability to intrude rests primarily with the
individual. So long as a person does not engage in behavior arising to
probable cause of a criminal violation, individual privacy cannot be in-
vaded. Once the analysis changes to the reasonableness test's balancing
of a proffered government interest against an individual's privacy inter-
est, though, the individual loses much of her ability to control the right to
intrude. The focus now turns to policy judgments that may override the
innocence of the individual's actions (such as driving a car or applying
for ajob promotion). Instead of focusing on the individual's actions, the
Court will ask policy questions: How important is the governmental ob-
jective? How immediate is the problem being addressed? What is the best
means for achieving the objective?5 7 Consequently, if the intrusion gains
judicial approval as being "reasonable," the individual can avoid the in-
trusion only by foregoing what is otherwise a legitimate activity.
The shift's second effect is to import the Madisonian dilemma into
the Amendment. As noted earlier, under traditional Warrant Clause
analysis, the facts upon which the government's justification rests are pri-
marily historical (did the facts add up to probable cause? did exigent cir-
cumstances really exist?) and do not require an evaluation of a govern-
mental policy judgment. Once the reasonableness inquiry is undertaken,
though, the government's judgment that the particular intrusion is
needed because of policy concerns becomes an integral part of the
Fourth Amendment analysis. As a result, the Madisonian dilemma now
arises, or at least appears to, of why the judiciary should invalidate an
action found to be necessary by a democratically elected body or its ap-
pointed representatives. And the perceived dilemma is especially acute
for the Fourth Amendment because the specter of an overstepping judi-
ciary acting against the majority's desires is heightened when review of
the government's decision is cast as only requiring that the intrusion be
"reasonable." Not surprisingly, once framed in this manner and given
56. See generally, Gerald S. Reamey, When "Special Needs" Meet Probable Cause:
Denying the Devil Benefit of Law, 19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 295, 300-22 (1992) (tracing
increasing role of reasonableness balancing test in Fourth Amendment cases); Sundby,
supra note 2, at 397-414 (tracing how Camara and Terny changed nature of Fourth
Amendment inquiry).
57. Indeed, the Court has frequently excused the vagueness of its reasonableness
balancing test by stating that "there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness.'"
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 536 (1967)); see also
New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 116 (1986) (same).
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the magnitude of the type of societal problems that governmental intru-
sions will address-such as weapons possession, drunk driving, drug use,
and gang activity-judicial review increasingly will defer to the govern-
ment's judgment that the intrusion was necessary.58
Although the propriety of such deference under the Fourth
Amendment can and will be criticized,59 the point to be made here is that
the inevitable long-term effect of importing the Madisonian dilemma into
the Amendment through a balancing test was to shift control from the
individual over the "facts" justifying the government's power to intrude
(by not engaging in behavior giving rise to probable cause) to the govern-
ment's ability to forge a "reasonable" policy justification. This shift in
control will continue so long as the legal formula continues to be cast as a
weighing of the government's policy judgment on the need for the intru-
sion, to which the Court will be deferential, against the individual's pri-
vacy interest, which, as was described earlier, is contracting.
D. The Quagmire of Reasonableness
Besides altering the legal analysis used to decide a Fourth
Amendment dispute, the shift to a reasonableness inquiry also creates an
interesting rhetorical side effect that makes any ensuing Fourth
Amendment critique more difficult.6 0 Because the very notion of
reasonableness embodies the idea of "balancing" competing interests, the
tendency, so long as the government can put forward some legitimate
58. Such deference is evident in Chief Justice Rehnquist's approval of sobriety
checkpoints, despite evidence that they were ineffective in deterring drunk driving. See
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1990). The Chief Justice
dismissed earlier Fourth Amendment cases requiring review of the effectiveness of a search
or seizure in achieving the government objective as "not [being] meant to transfer from
politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable
alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public
danger." Id. at 453; see also id. at 453-54 (holding that "for purposes of Fourth
Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives remains with the
governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for,
limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers."). In contrast, the
Michigan Supreme Court on remand invalidated the stops under the State Constitution,
because "Michigan [has not] completely acquiesced to the judgment of 'politically
accountable officials' when determining reasonableness." Sitz v. Michigan Dep't of State
Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 224 (Mich. 1993); see also infra notes 221-225 and accompanying
text.
59. See discussion infra Parts III.D.3 and D.4. See generally Nadine Strossen,
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to Meaningful Judicial Enforcement
- of Constitutional Rights, 42 Hastings LJ. 285, 293-95, 318-21 (1991) (criticizing Sitz
Court's deference and arguing that such deference is not in accord with Fourth
Amendment precedent).
60. For discussion of the importance of the rhetoric used to discuss legal issues
generally and the Fourth Amendment specifically, see James B. White, Heracles' Bow:
Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law 28-48 (1985); James B. White, The Fourth
Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974
Sup. Ct. Rev. 165.
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reason for its actions, is to find that some intrusion is allowed, although
perhaps not to the level the government would prefer. This is true be-
cause, although extreme images can be summoned up where all would
agree that the government behavior was "unreasonable," such as the po-
lice goose-stepping down Main Street or listening in on family mealtime
conversations through Orwellian devices, 61 the vast majority of cases will
involve both legitimate government and privacy interests, yielding no
black or white "right" answers but only questions of which shade of grey is
better.
As a result, a Fourth Amendment demilitarized zone ("DMZ") is cre-
ated where it is difficult to challenge any particular holding or approach
as jeopardizing Fourth Amendment values because the individual case is
consumed within the larger context of reasonableness and is minimized
by comparison to the extremes. Not surprisingly, most of the Court's
Fourth Amendment opinions purport to strike a compromise by allowing
the intrusion to proceed (thus acknowledging the legitimacy of the gov-
ernment's interest), while limiting the circumstances and means under
which the intrusion can occur (and, therefore, in theory preserving some
of the citizenry's privacy interest).62 Thus, while a warrantless search of a
student's purse without probable cause at first might excite some concern
under the Warrant Clause about government overreaching, once pro-
jected onto the wide-screen of reasonableness, it simply becomes a
"school case" concerning student discipline, a far cry from the archetypal
evil of a police state. 63 Any criticisms become entangled with the amor-
phous definition of what is "reasonable" and run the risk of sounding
absolutist and ideologically rigid.
One of the challenges to those who believe that Fourth Amendment
values are being eroded in a more serious manner is to move into this
DMZ of reasonableness and persuasively argue, both to the public and
the courts, why the Fourth Amendment is in jeopardy even though a po-
lice state is not on the immediate horizon. One must show why it is incor-
61. Likewise, if the balance were to shift to the other extreme and police efforts to
control crime were so handcuffed that one could flaunt criminal activity while the police
were forced to watch helplessly, then all would agree that privacy interests were being too
strictly emphasized.
62. Both Camara and Teny, the cases that opened the door to the reasonableness test,
were themselves carefully portrayed as compromise decisions between the government's
argument that the Fourth Amendment did not apply at all and the petitioner's argument
that a warrant based on traditional probable cause was required. For other examples, see
cases cited infra notes 63-64.
63. The Court's "splitting the difference" approach is evident in NewJersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985), which concerned searches of secondary school students. In
describing how the lower courts had "struggled to accommodate" the competing
government and student interests, the majority tellingly stated that some courts had
resolved the struggle "by giving full force to one or the other side of the balance." Id. at
332 n.2. In contrast, the majority avoided giving "full force to one or the other side" by
requiring reasonable suspicion as a middle point between probable cause and no suspicion
at all. Id.
1770 [Vol. 94:1751
"EVER}MAN" 'S FOURTH AMENDMENT
rect to dismiss the Court's string of recent decisions as simply further
small swings of the reasonableness pendulum that involve discrete and
difficult social problems like "bus cases," "drunk driving cases," "sensitive
job cases," "train wreck cases," "helicopter cases," "garbage can cases,"
"drug lab cases," "school discipline cases," "factory survey cases," and so
on.64 Without such an explanation, criticisms of the Court's holdings
simply will sound like an alarmist's call for an inflexible Fourth
Amendment that ignores the Amendment's requirement of accommodat-
ing society's interests, in addition to the individual's, in striking the
reasonableness balance.
III. A NEW FOURTH AMENDMENT METAPHOR:
GOVERNMENT-CITIZEN TRUST
The Fourth Amendment as a privacy-focused doctrine has not fared
well with the changing times of an increasingly non-private world and a
judicial reluctance to expand individual rights. These developments ne-
cessitate that critics of the Court's analysis provide new, strongerjustifica-
tions for why these protections are essential not only to the individual but
also to the community. Stated more provocatively, scholars must address
why, in a world plagued by terrorism, drug cartels, and drive-by killings,
the Court's definition of "unreasonable searches and seizures" should not
give deference to heightened law enforcement needs and advanced tech-
nological approaches that permit broad government surveillance.
Moreover, any alternative vision that hopes to be persuasive must rec-
ognize that the Court is not about to abandon its reliance on the
Reasonableness Clause and completely reverse direction. It is far too late
in the judicial day, and perhaps unwise, to call for a return to a Fourth
Amendment analysis founded solely upon the Warrant Clause. If the
only form in which the Fourth Amendment could apply to government
intrusions was in the traditional Warrant Clause formulation of requiring
a warrant based on probable cause, the Court likely would not have ap-
plied the Amendment to certain intrusions-the safety inspections at is-
sue in Camara, for example-that now are covered by the Amendment.
65
64. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (involving routine boarding of
buses and asking passengers for permission to search baggage); Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (involving sobriety checks of drivers); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (involving drug screening of
employees holding sensitive positions); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602 (1989) (involving drug and alcohol testing of railway employees); Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445 (1989) (involving helicopter surveillance of property); California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (involving police searches of curbside trash); United States
v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (involving search of drug lab in barn); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
325 (involving searches by public school officials); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (involving "factory surveys" to identify illegal aliens).
65. See Sundby, supra note 2, at 415-16 (discussing problems with requiring warrants
based on traditional probable cause for every search and seizure). See generally Anthony
G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 393-95
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Consequently, the question that needs to be addressed in a post-Camara
world is how the policy judgments are to be made where the Court's pri-
mary rubric is one of reasonableness and where notions of a warrant and
probable cause must provide their own justification for applying to a gov-
ernment intrusion.
A- The Power of the Metaphor
A student of the Court's constitutional decisionmaking quickly be-
comes acquainted with balancing tests in all their various shapes and
sizes: strict and rational; two-part, three-part, and four-part; unitary and
sliding.66 Such tests do provide some guidance to those needing to deter-
mine the constitutionality of their actions. We can be fairly confident
that a court will look more carefully at legislative action under a strict
scrutiny standard than when using a rational basis test. Yet, because the
-very process of weighing competing interests requires evaluative judg-
ments, plenty of room remains for disagreement even where all agree on
the stated test.67 The malleability of even stringent standards, such as
those requiring a compelling government interest or a "special" govern-
ment need, for example, can be seen in the Court's tendency to almost
always find a "special need" justifying departure from the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Clause requirement.
68
Despite the legal community's predilection for trying to capture a
constitutional principle through a carefully formulated test, occasionally
a metaphor or animating image emerges that captures the underlying
(1974) (discussing problems with a monolithic view of Fourth Amendment based only
upon Warrant Clause). Of course, deciding how the Amendment should apply to
administrative inspections presents its own interpretation problems. See Sundby, supra
note 2, at 425-27 (arguing that Camara-type searches would be better analyzed under
Reasonableness Clause than Warrant Clause).
66. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 Yale LJ. 943, 949-50 (1987) (discussing history and use of balancing in constitutional
analysis).
67. The disagreement is in part because, as Professor David Faigman has argued
convincingly, the balancing tests as currently used by the Court have a tendency to
overemphasize the government's interests, see David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual
Rights and Government Interests: Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice,
78 Va. L. Rev. 1521 (1992), and to misuse empirical evidence, see David L. Faigman,
"Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541 (1991).
68. The Court's quickness in dispensing with the Warrant Clause's requirements has
been especially evident in cases involving searches for narcotics. See California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565, 600 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that
since [1982] .... the Court has heard argument in 30 Fourth Amendment cases
involving narcotics. In all but one, the government was the petitioner. All save
two involved a search or seizure without a warrant or with a defective warrant.
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essence of a constitutional value far better than the legal test.69 One of
the most notable examples is Justice Holmes's characterization of the
First Amendment's Free Speech Clause as resting upon the belief that
"the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market."70 Without the captivating image of the
marketplace of ideas, one might question whether Justice Holmes's prof-
fered legal test,71 written in dissent, would have gained the acceptance
that it later did from the Court.
72
More fundamentally, the marketplace of ideas metaphor largely has
driven both public debate over the proper role of the First Amendment
and the Court's subsequent development of First Amendment jurispru-
dence. Although the metaphor is not itself a legal test or rule, it serves as
69. James Boyd White, who has constantly reminded us of the importance of language
in understanding the law, notes that
Despite its tone, and despite the way we often talk about it, the Constitution
has no force except to the extent that it is invoked and used by individual
Americans pursuing actual goals. Until used it is inert. Alone it can do
nothing....
The Constitution works by creating the occasions and warrants for making a
certain set of claims, and in this respect it is like the other constitutions we are
always making in our own lives.
James B. White, When Words Lose Their Meaning, 244-45 (1984). For an incisive look at
how language can affect a court's ability to conceptualize issues and thus influence the
outcome, see DenisJ. Brion, The Ineffable: Metaphor and the Prisonhouse of Language,
in Flux, Complexity, and Illusion 81 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1993).
70. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For a
fascinating account of howJustice Holmes evolved from a rather cramped view of the First
Amendment as evidenced by his opinions in the 1919 Espionage Act cases to a view of the
Amendment as embracing a "'search for truth' metaphor," see G. Edward White, Justice
Holmes and the Modernization of Free SpeechJurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80
Cal. L. Rev. 391, 419-42 (1992).
71. After developing the metaphorical image of a marketplace of ideas, Justice
Holmes then proposed the formal legal test that the voicing of opinions should not be
"check[ed] ... unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful
and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country."
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. Although Justice Holmes had earlier articulated a clear and
present danger test, the reformulation presented in Abrams dramatically changed the tenor
of the test's application. Whereas the earlier test had given ample room for government
control of speech, the Abrams test was far more restrictive upon the government's power to
suppress speech. See White, supra note 70, at 440-41 (noting that "[n]eedless to say, after
Holmes's reformulation in Abrams, his conception of the First Amendment generally, and
of the 'clear and present danger' test in particular, bore little resemblance to their
counterparts in the 1919 Espionage Act cases").
72. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (expression of opinion may
not be suppressed "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action"). The clear and
present danger legal test itself, however, has been criticized as being more of a "literary
device" than a legal test. See David A. Anderson, Metaphorical Scholarship, 79 Cal. L. Rev.
1205, 1208 n.20 (1991) (book review). See also Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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the pictorial backdrop to the legal arguments surrounding free speech
issues and prevents the hardening of First Amendment legal tests into
black-letter rules that can be applied woodenly. Nor is it any accident
that the marketplace image caught the American imagination, as it aptly
embodies fundamental values underlying American society, such as be-
liefs in individualism and capitalism. In many ways, the marketplace met-
aphor became the mythological story behind the First Amendment so
that any judicial result allowing suppression of an "idea" must be justified
not only under a given legal test, but as being congruent with the story of
the marketplace of ideas.73
As noted earlier, the Fourth Amendment has had its own guiding
image, that of the "right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men."74 As with the market-
place of ideas, this "right to be let alone" also has had a marked impact
on the development of constitutional law, extending its influence not
only over the Fourth Amendment 75 but also aiding in the eventual recog-
nition of a distinct constitutional "right of privacy." 76 And, like the mar-
ketplace metaphor, the values represented by the "right to be let alone"
are powerfully embedded-within American society: images of individual-
ism; the home as one's castle; and the desire for freedom from govern-
ment interference that led the colonists to seek the New World.77
73. This is not to say that the marketplace of ideas metaphor has been without its
detractors, only that the metaphor has continued to influence and shape First Amendment
debate despite such criticisms. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on
Freedom of Speech: A Treatise on the First Amendment § 2.02 (1994) (discussing merits
and criticisms of marketplace of ideas as metaphor for First Amendment); Stanley Ingber,
The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke LJ. 1 (arguing that
marketplace of ideas is based on implausible assumptions).
74. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (BrandeisJ., dissenting).
75. See generally Note, supra note 13, at 196-203. In Justice Brandeis's view, the
Fourth Amendment worked in tandem with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination to protect the right to be left alone: "[E]very unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal
proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth."
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79.
76. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court relied upon the Fourth Amendment as one of
the specific guarantees that creates a zone of privacy. See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85
(1965). Justice Goldberg's concurrence specifically quoted from Justice Brandeis's dissent
in Olmytead. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
77. Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Olmstead still stands as one of the most
eloquent expressions of the values at stake:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.
1774 [Vol. 94:1751
"EVERYMAN" 'S FOURTH AMENDMENT
Developments such as growing government regulation and ex-
panding technological capacity, however, have robbed the "right to be let
alone" of much of its power to control the legal discourse concerning the
Fourth Amendment.78 Invoking the right to be let alone in arguing
against an automobile checkpoint or an urinalysis test likely will sound
more like an appeal to some Wordsworthian utopia than a guiding princi-
ple for Fourth Amendment decisionmaking in the modem world. Thus,
although privacy undoubtedly remains an essential American value, the
concept no longer fully captures the Fourth Amendment's role as a
meaningful regulator of government-citizen interactions.7 9 What is
needed is a look at what values are at stake beyond physical privacy inter-
ests and a way of expressing these values that impresses upon the public
why seemingly mundane and almost distasteful Fourth Amendment is-
sues, such as whether the Amendment protects garbage bags or urine
specimens, hold importance for how the United States and its
Constitution function.
Suggesting that the Fourth Amendment is founded upon values
broader than the protection of physical privacy alone is not a novel prop-
osition. Professor Amsterdam, in an article that has become a sacred text
for Fourth Amendment worshippers, has observed that
[t]he ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment ...
[W] hether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the
p6lice is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional re-
straints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citi-
zens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the
aims of a free and open society.
80
Similarly, some judicial opinions will disapprove of a particular govern-
ment practice because it "undermine [s] that confidence and sense of se-
curity in dealing with one another that is characteristic of individual rela-
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
78. See generally supra notes 27-64 and accompanying text (discussing why privacy
does not adequately protect Fourth Amendment values).
79. This loss of persuasive power may be in part because privacy holds the potential
for being construed in a variety of ways, both expansively and restrictively. Justice Black
noted this potential in his Griswold dissent:
One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally
guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional
guarantee another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less
restricted in meaning. This fact is well illustrated by the use of the term "right of
privacy" as a comprehensive substitute for the Fourth Amendment's guarantee
against "unreasonable searches and seizures." "Privacy" is a broad, abstract and
ambiguous concept which can easily be shrunken in meaning but which can also,
on the other hand, easily be interpreted as a constitutional ban against many
things other than searches and seizures.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting).
80. Amsterdam, supra note 65, at 403; see also Geoffrey R Stone, The Scope of the
Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents and Informers,




tionships between citizens in a free society,"81 or because the government
intrusion imposes "risks [a person] should [not] be forced to assume in a
free and open society,"82 or because the government's actions resemble
practices commonly associated with Big Brother and totalitarian states. 83
Such statements, however, almost always are found in dissents.
Though one may agree with the premise that it is the very concept of a
"free society" which is at stake in these cases, when recited as a legal rea-
son, it sounds a bit like pouting over the majority's result. Presumably
the Justices in the majority also are fond of a "free society," so that with-
out further elaboration the argument has the resonance of begging the
question.84 It would be as ifJustice Holmes in his Abrams dissent had not
founded his argument for a clear and present danger test upon the mar-
ketplace of ideas metaphor, but, instead, had proclaimed summarily that
his approach was the only one consistent with speech in a free society.
Instead of the captivating image of the marketplace of ideas and its ani-
mating idea that the best test for truth is intellectual testing rather than
suppression, the opinion would have left us with the far less vivid invoca-
tion of the general ideals of a free society.
The task, therefore, is to proceed a step further and ask how the
Fourth Amendment protects a "free society" beyond physical privacy in-
terests. Or, as Professor John Mitchell, who also has thought of the
Fourth Amendment in metaphorical terms, has stated the challenge, we
must rethink the Amendment in terms of how it is "in keeping with some
basic vision of America."8 5 But what animating principle can capture the
aspect of the Amendment that now is eluding the Court's treatment of
Fourth Amendment issues?
81. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
82. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466-67 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949)); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 290 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (warning that majority's description of probable
cause as "common sense" and "nontechnical" are "but code words for an overly permissive
attitude towards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment").
84. Indeed, the majority's argument may well be that certain repressive measures are
necessary to protect a free government against anarchy or lawlessness. See, e.g., National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1989) (justifying suspicionless
drug testing of Customs agents because otherwise "national interest in self-protection
could be irreparably damaged").
85. Mitchell, supra note 27, at 41. In his provocative article, Professor Mitchell also
argues, although for somewhat different reasons, that the Fourth Amendment's current
metaphors have failed to define the Amendment's protections adequately. See id. at
42-44. Although this Article was written without the benefit of knowing Professor
Mitchell's call for such a discussion, in many ways it is an attempt to meet his challenge of
offering a specific vision of America that would help define the Fourth Amendment.
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B. Trust as a Constitutional Value
Lacking the skills of a master phrase-turner like ajustice Holmes or a
Justice Scalia, and at the risk of sounding like the Peter, Paul, and Mary of
constitutional law, I would characterize the jeopardized constitutional
value underlying the Fourth Amendment as that of "trust" between the
government and the citizenry. This vision of the Fourth Amendment's
purpose is founded upon the idea that integral to the Constitution and
our societal view of government is a reciprocal trust between the govern-
ment and its citizens.8 6 Government action draws its legitimacy from the
trust that the electorate places in its representatives by choosing them to
govern. This mandate from the citizenry legitimatizes government ac-
tion, however, only if the citizenry's decision itself is an informed and free
choice such that the government can claim that it has the true consent of
the governed. To achieve this legitimatizing mandate, therefore, the gov-
ernment itself must act so that it does not imperil the citizenry's ability to
give its consent in an informed and free manner. Such governmental
behavior will include trusting the People's ability to deal properly with
information and materials that the government otherwise might ban as
well as trusting the People to act responsibly and in accord with properly
enacted laws and societal standards.
The first area of trust, of course, falls mainly within the purview of
the First Amendment and the need to trust the citizenry to choose wisely
in the marketplace of ideas.8 7 It is the second area of trust-trust that
the citizenry will exercise its liberties responsibly-that implicates the
Fourth Amendment and is jeopardized when the government is allowed
to intrude into the citizenry's lives without a finding that the citizenry has
forfeited society's trust to exercise its freedoms responsibly.88
Even a rudimentary comparison of democratic to totalitarian and an-
archist states demonstrates the central role that government-citizen trust
plays in a free society. Totalitarian regimes maintain power not through
86. Francis Fukuyama has utilized a similar notion of "reciprocal recognition" in an
attempt to explain the rise of the modem liberal state. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of
History and the Last Man 199-208 (1992).
87. The classic work on this view of the First Amendment is Alexander Meiklejohn,
Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948).
88. In the words of James Childress,
Liberal, pluralist democracy is primarily procedural. Its consensus about
procedure ... is the foundation for mutual trust at least in the political arena.
Although this consensus does not have to be universal, it does have to be
widespread .... [Miutual trust, ... politically defined, is the confidence in or
reliance on others who are also committed to a way of conducting and resolving
disputes about values; it is the expectation that they will generally comply with the
outcomes even when they do not endorse them.
James F. Childress, Civil Disobedience and Trust 7 (1975). Although this Article's focus is
on the trust relationship between government and citizen, how the Fourth Amendment is
interpreted also affects the trust relationship between individuals. See Stone, supra note




the consent of the governed but by physical, economic, and psychological
control over the populace. Such governments exercise control through a
variety of means, but among the most essential is the use of the police
power to reinforce the message that the government is superior and in
control of the individual.8 9 Measures such as identification checkpoints,
random searches, the monitoring of communications, and the wide-
spread use of informants not only are means of keeping track of the citi-
zenry, but also act as continuous symbolic reminders that the citizenry is
dominated by the government. Far from fostering trust, the govern-
ment's actions convey a message of distrust in order to perpetuate control
of the citizenry.90
Likewise, societies besieged by civil unrest provide examples of the
importance that the trust be reciprocal. While many factors may cause
unrest, certainly one of the most prevalent is distrust of the government's
willingness to listen to the dissidents' voices and respect their interests.91
When such distrust occurs, the disenchanted group will view the govern-
ment as illegitimate and be inclined to look to means outside the formal
political process to have its voice heard. 92 In the best scenario, such ac-
tions will be peaceful acts of civil disobedience that will produce mean-
89. One of the most powerful literary portrayals of how totalitarian regimes operate is
Viclav Havel's collection of essays, Viclav Havel or Living in Truth (Jan Vladislav ed.,
1986) [hereinafter Living in Truth]. See also A. James Gregor, Contemporary Radical
Ideologies: Totalitarian Thought in the Twentieth Century 20-21 (1968) (describing
characteristics of totalitarian states).
90. Cf. Childress, supra note 88, at 6 ("Trust implies freedom. It is impossible where
there is absolute control over another person. When a person is 'under control,' he is not
'trusted' because he has no freedom to act differently.").
91. See Ralph W. Conant, The Prospects for Revolution: A Study of Riots, Civil
Disobedience, and Insurrection in Contemporary America 62-64 (1971) (finding that
rioters of 1960s primarily were individuals who felt government was unlikely to respond to
their concerns). One need only take a quick tour of international spots of unrest to
confirm how feelings of exclusion can spawn unrest. See, e.g., Richard Bernstein, Turmoil
in China, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1989, at Al (noting "intensity of distrust" of government
surrounding Tiananmen Square protests); Terry Greene, Roots of Revolt: Poverty, Neglect
Planted Seeds of Mexico's Zapatista Uprising, Ariz. Republic, Feb. 6, 1994, at Al, A20
(describing how Zapatista rebels' "fundamental distrust of the government" has led to
armed conflict with government); Tsegaye Tadesse, Angolans, UNITA Locked in Talks on
Conflict, Reuters Ltd.,Jan. 29, 1993 (discussing difficulty of reviving peace accords because
"distrust ha[s] never been higher").
92. As the poet Robert Penn Warren explained in refusing to sign a statement in
support of French military disobedience in Algeria, the question of whether to obey a law
one views as unjust is dependent upon
his trust for orderly change.... If he trusts his society, and state, he knows that if
he disobeys he violates the concept of law which is the guarantee of the right to
protest; he knows that if he disobeys, he undercuts the basis of democratic society.
This situation is posited upon his trust in his society and state. If he does not have
this trust in the orderly process of self-rectification for the state and society, he
may very well resort to disobedience.
Childress, supra note 88, at 9-10 (quoting Robert Penn Warren).
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ingful change; 93 in the worst case, the disenfranchised will turn to terror-
ism and acts of violence. 94 Indeed, the process may become circular as
acts of protest and rebellion provoke oppressive actions by a distrustful
government. These measures, in turn, create greater resentment and dis-
trust of the government among the populace and further fuel its discon-
tent and unrest.
9 5
The above examples are not meant to suggest that the United States
is on the verge of slipping into a cycle of totalitarianism and anarchy.
They do suggest, however, that a crucial part of American democracy's
staying power is the role of reciprocal government-citizen trust in foster-
ing the confidence among all individuals that they have the opportunities
and capabilities to participate meaningfully in society.9 6 Individuals and
groups who feel that the government is not recognizing their concerns
and beliefs may otherwise perceive the government as lacking legitimacy,
resulting in an increased sense of alienation and lack of confidence that
the government will respond seriously to their needs.9 7 The sustainability
of our constitutional system of government is thus largely dependent
upon ensuring that this reciprocal trust is maintained.
To think of the Constitution and, especially, the Bill of Rights as
means of enhancing the legitimacy of government and society through
acknowledgment of the citizenry's dignity and value requires some read-
93. Under the right circumstances, civil disobedience ultimately may enhance trust by
causing the system to respond and accommodate those who feel disenfranchised. See id.
at 13-14; Conant, supra note 91, at 16-21 (arguing that civil disobedience has role in
democracy as means of stimulating change).
94. See Conant, supra note 91, at 7-10, 21-22 (tracing how civil disobedience
escalates to rioting and insurrection if participants do not believe change will be
forthcoming).
95. See id. at36 (noting that "[government] overcontrol [sic] usuallyleads to increased
frustration and conflict. People in the ghetto see the police as violent and strike back with
increasing intensity which leads eventually to insurrectionist activities").
96. A primary focus of Critical Race Theory is on how controlling legal doctrine acts
to exclude certain sectors of society from meaningful participation. See, e.g., Mari J.
Matsuda et al., Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First
Amendment (1993); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in
American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 Cornell
L. Rev. 1258, 1284-88 (1992) (arguing that First Amendment view premised upon
marketplace of ideas "often make[s] matters worse").
97. Much of the rioting aftermath following the verdicts in the state trial of the
officers charged with the unlawful use of police force on Rodney King has been attributed
to the sense in the minority community that the criminal justice system discriminates
against minorities. See, e.g., James H. Johnson, Jr. & Walter C. Farrell, Jr., The Fire This
Time: The Genesis of the Los Angeles Rebellion of 1992, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1403, 1404
(1993); Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the
Critical Tools of the Sixties, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2231, 2249-52 (1993); Jessica Crosby, King
Testimony a Catalyst for Blacks' Complaints of Police Bias, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1993, at
A3; Ruth Marcus, Racial Bias Widely Seen in Criminal Justice System; Research Often
Supports Black Perceptions, Wash. Post, May 12, 1992, at A4; Eva Paterson, Desperate
People Take It to the Streets, S.F. Chron., May 1, 1992, at A31; The Product of Hateful
Racism, Boston Globe, May 2, 1992, at 18.
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justment of traditional thinking about the Founders' purposes.98 The
time-honored story most often taught is that of a Lockean "rights" view-
point: the Constitution was a social contract that preserved certain natu-
ral rights, such as the right to accumulate private property, while setting
up the basic framework necessary for society to function.99
In this context, "rights" become enclaves from government interfer-
ence, and one simply reads down the Bill of Rights to identify where
those enclaves exist: the right to say and think what one chooses, the
right to associate with whom one desires, the right to practice one's reli-
gious beliefs free from government dictates, and on through the amend-
ments one proceeds. Using this perspective, when one reaches the
Fourth Amendment, Justice Brandeis's depiction of the Amendment's
purpose as being the protection of the "right to be let alone" fits per-
fectly, identifying yet another enclave where the individual is free from
government interference.
While it may be true that the Bill of Rights creates enclaves of indi-
vidual freedom, such a vision captures only part of the reason why the Bill
of Rights is so important. Of equal, if not greater, importance is the ac-
knowledgment accompanying the granting of such rights that the recipi-
ent is someone deserving of the respect and dignity that comes with their
bestowal and the trust that the right will be exercised responsibly.
Although the Bill of Rights was in part born out of a distrust of the fed-
eral government, the Antifederalists also saw the document as outlining
98. The passage of the Bill of Rights primarily was an effort to satisfy Antifederalist
concerns about an overreaching national government and, in this sense, is most properly
characterized as an expression of distrust of the government. See generally Robert A.
Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776-1791, at 159-89 (Bicentennial ed. 1991)
(tracing Bill of Rights as compromise agreed to by Federalists to obtain ratification). The
underlying premise of the Constitution, however, was very much the idea that the
government derived its power from the consent of the people and that obedience
to the government depended upon the "pervasiveness of representational consent through
all parts of the government." Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic, 1776-1787, 602 (1969). Indeed, Antifederalist fears of an overreaching federal
government stemmed in part, as Professor Amar has noted, out of a concern that Congress
would be too distant from the people to be able to rule by trust rather than force:
Anti-Federalists feared that the aristocrats who would control Congress would
have an insufficient sense of sympathy with, and connectedness to, ordinary
people. Unlike state legislators, 'lordly' men in Congress would disdain their
lowly constituents, who would in turn lose confidence in the national
government. In the end, the new government would be obliged to rule through
corruption, force and fear-with monopolies and standing armies-rather than
through mutual confidence. . . . [B]ecause of the attenuated chain of
representation, Congress would be far less trustworthy than state legislatures.
Akhil R Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1140 (1991).
99. See generally Glendon, supra note 40, at 47-75 (discussing origins of "the lone
rights-bearer" as image of American constitutional rights).
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"the fundamental principles of their political being."100 Or, as one
Antifederalist stated,
[T] hose rights characterize the man, essentially the true republi-
can, the citizen of this continent; their enumeration, in head of
the new constitution, can inspire and conserve the affection for
the native country, they will be the first lesson of the young citi-
zens becoming men, to sustain the dignity of their being .... 101
The Antifederalists believed that reinforcing these virtues was especially
crucial because "the real protection of liberty [lies] ... not in property
rights and commerce as such, but rather in those institutions that would
promote the courage, independence, judgment and selflessness of the
citizenry."1
02
Nor was such an understanding limited to the Antifederalists' view of
the Bill of Rights. The post-Revolution period saw the "basic conviction
of orthodox eighteenth-century political science, that 'the Legislature has
all the power, of all the people,' "103 give way to the "radical" idea that the
power of the sovereign ultimately was seated in the people.10 4 Radical
writers increasingly questioned the traditional theory of "virtual represen-
tation," the idea that the people gave up their power to their representa-
tives, arguing instead that" '[i]f power sufficient to control the Officers of
Government is not seated in the people,' then the Revolution had been
meaningless. 'Who have we... besides the people? and if they are not to
be trusted with the care of their own interests who can?' "105
The idea that self-government meant that the People were to be
trusted with the power to govern themselves eventually found its voice in
the Constitution as the "climax of a... momentous upheaval in the un-
derstanding of politics." 0 6 Both the Federalists and Antifederalists, de-
spite their different notions of how a national government should be
structured, premised their arguments on the idea that the People were
100. Herbert J. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in The American
Founding- Politics, Statesmanship, and the Constitution 42 (Ralph A. Rossum & Gary L.
McDowell eds., 1981).
101. Id. (quoting Va. Independent Chron.,June 25, 1788). This aspirational aspect of
the Antifederalists' position "explains the affirmation of natural rights, the 'oughts,' the
unenforceable generality of the state bills of rights and of many of the Antifederalists'
proposals." Id.; see also Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist
Empire: Anti-Federalism From the Attack on "Monarchism" to Moderm Localism, 84 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 74, 92 (1989) ("Anti-Federalist speeches and writings were shot through with a
kind of ideal type of citizen: the model was the yeoman, the citizen of the 'middling'
sort-the respectable, knowledgeable, frugal and public-spirited individual, who acts upon
deliberation and cooperation ....").
102. Rose, supra note 101, at 93.
103. Wood, supra note 98, at 381.
104. See id. at 374.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 594.
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the sole source of the new government's legitimacy.' 0 7 The government
was to be one where "all government officials.., were agents of the peo-
ple,"'08 for government " 'has of itself no rights; they are altogether
duties.' "109
This underlying conceptualization of government, when coupled
with a society that was undergoing dramatic change, of which equality was
"the most radical and most powerful ideological force let loose in the
[American] Revolution,"110 was to reshape American society into one
where the "goal of society and government" would be "the interests and
prosperity of ordinary people."1 l ' Viewed against this political and socie-
tal background, the Constitution can be understood as part of a broader
movement that transformed government rule from an aristocratic en-
deavor to one based upon a recognition of the citizenry as its source of
power. 112 And, once understood in this way, the vesting of a right in the
citizen becomes not only a shield against government power but also an
act of governmental recognition of the citizen as a responsible individual
in whom it places its trust.
This notion, that a constitutional right serves the dual purpose of
protecting citizens against unwarranted government action and recogniz-
ing their legitimacy as societal actors, also can be seen in the develop-
ment of what Professor Gordon Wood calls "democratized public opin-
ion."113 According to Wood, the constitutional principle that citizens
have the right of equal and individual participation helped to foster ac-
ceptance of the idea that truth was to be decided in the arena of public
opinion. 1 4 In this sense, it was a belief in equality and in the notion that
every citizen's opinion is worthwhile, rather than the First Amendment
107. See id. at 471-565 (tracing evolving arguments of Federalists and Antifederalists
and how they incorporated the idea of the People as sovereign).
108. Id. at 598.
109. Id. at 601 (quoting Thomas Paine). In his Virginia report denouncing the Alien
and Sedition Acts, James Madison made a similar statement noting that in the United
States, unlike England, "[the] people, not the government possess the absolute
sovereignty." James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 1799-1800, in IV The
Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution
546-53, 561-80 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1836).
110. Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 232 (1992); see
also id. at 233 ("The 'Spirit of Equality' . . . brought 'democratic dignity' to even 'the arm
that wields a pick or drives a spike.' " (citations omitted)).
111. Id. at 8.
112. See id. ("The Revolution brought respectability and even dominance to ordinary
people long held in contempt and gave dignity to their menial labor in a manner
unprecedented in history...."). The extent to which egalitarianism would alter America,
however, was largely unanticipated by the Founders who had envisioned equality as a
means of "building a classical republic of elitist virtue." Id. at 369. Instead, many of the
Founders felt towards the end of their lifetimes that the egalitarian experiment had only
fostered commercialism and anti-intellectualism. See id. at 365-69.
113. Id. at 364.
114. See id. at 347-69 (describing how "public opinion" developed from democratic
ideas of Founders and ultimately went even further than the Founders had anticipated).
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itself, that created a marketplace of ideas. Without such an active belief
in "democratized public opinion," Justice Holmes never would have had a
marketplace to protect.
The need for a government to recognize the human dignity of its
citizenry can be convincingly argued on historical and philosophical
grounds." 5 However, one need not travel back to ancient Greece to
make the argument because contemporary concerns highlight the con-
tinued need for such government recognition. Perhaps the most vivid
example is the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Educationl" 6
to abandon the "separate but equal""17 doctrine not because the "tangi-
ble"" 8 factors associated with education were unequal, but because such
segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority as to [minority children's]
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.""l9 The Brown Court correctly saw what the
Plessy v. Ferguson120 Court had not:1 21 that the Equal Protection Clause in
part embodies the intangible value of giving full and equal respect to the
individual and not simply the provision of the same "tangible" re-
sources. 122 A similar shift in judicial sensitivity to the implications of
115. For the most articulate recent examination of the role of human dignity in the
formation of governments, see Fukuyama, supra note 86, at 204-06. By drawing upon the
Greek notion of "thymos," which, roughly translated, means the desire or spirit for
recognition, see id. at 162, and then tracing the concept through various philosophers,
especially Hegel, Fukuyama makes the argument that such a desire is "the primary motor
driving human history." Id. In particular, Fukuyama sees the desire for recognition as
playing the pivotal role in the notion of popular self-government:
In what way can we say that modem liberal democracy "recognizes" all
human beings universally?
It does this by granting and protecting their rights .... Recognition becomes
reciprocal when the state and the people recognize each other, that is, when the
state grants its citizens rights and when citizens agree to abide by the state's laws.
Id. at 202-03.
116. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
117. Id. at 488 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
118. Id. at 493.
119. Id. at 494.
120. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
121. In P/essy, the Court stated:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it.
163 U.S. at 551.
122. AlthoughJustice Harlan's dissent in P/essy was still riddled with racist statements,
see, e.g., id. at 559 ("The white race deems itself to be the dominant race... [and] I doubt
not, it will continue to be for all time .... ."), the opinion did recognize that "[t]he arbitrary
separation of citizens, on the basis of race.... is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent
with the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Constitution." Id.
at 562. BecauseJustice Harlan recognized this dimension of constitutional rights, he asked
the critical question that the majority ignored:
17831994]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
a law beyond its mere formal application can be seen in Loving v.
Virginia.123 Before Loving, the Court had approved laws banning interra-
cial relationships because "[t]he punishment of each offending person,
whether white or black, [was] the same."124 In Loving, the Court recog-
nized that such laws violate equal protection because " '[d]istinctionsbe-
tween citizens solely because of their ancestry'... [are] 'odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality.' 125
A government-citizen trust metaphor in the context of the Fourth
Amendment is consistent with the Court's recognition in cases such as
Brown and Loving that rights are not simply enclaves of protection from
government interference but also affect the citizen's view of his or her
role in society. This recognition currently is absent from the Court's
Fourth Amendment doctrine, which frames the issue as a binary choice
between antagonistic interests-the government's law enforcement
needs and the individual's privacy interest. But concentrating solely on
the immediate factual dispute, such as the government's immediate need
for a urine specimen or to look in garbage cans, overlooks the long-term
values concerning the government's role in the constitutional framework
that are also implicated. 126 Only by recasting the overarching Fourth
Amendment question in terms of whether the government intrusion is
What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and
perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state enactments, which,
in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded
that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens?
Id. at 560.
123. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
124. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883).
125. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (1967) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
100 (1943)) (first alteration in original). In McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964),
the Court struck down a criminal law that punished only interracial cohabitation, but
found it unnecessary to reach the issue of criminalizing interracial marriages. See id. at
195-96.
126. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 655 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (expressing opinion that "the Framers would be appalled by the
vision of mass governmental intrusions upon the integrity of the human body that the
majority allows to become reality" through approval of drug-testing of railway employees).
Warnings against the danger of focusing on the short-term crisis at the expense of
long-term constitutional interests have been voiced by a number of greatJustices:
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when
constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure. The World War II
relocation-camp cases, and the Red scare and McCarthy-era internal subversion
cases, are only the most extreme reminders that when we allow fundamental
freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably
come to regret it.
Id. at 635 (citations omitted). In the words ofJustice Brandeis, "Experience should teach
us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are
beneficent. ... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). And as Justice Holmes reminds us:
1784 [Vol. 94:1751
'EVERYMAN" 'S FOURTH AMENDMENT
justified in light of government-citizen trust can the Court begin to place
the Fourth Amendment's purpose in a larger context that finds mutual
benefits from the Amendment for both the government and the citizen.
C. The Metaphor of Trust as the Fourth Amendment's Guiding Principle
127
Proposing the idea of government-citizen trust as a central value for
the Fourth Amendment has several immediate up-front liabilities. First,
the notion of trust sounds, and is in many ways, so simple, so nonlegalis-
tic, and so nonphilosophical, that it risks being dismissed as not suffi-
ciently grounded in legal-political theory. Indeed, the temptation is to
gussy up the metaphor of trust by wrapping it in fancier verbal packaging,
perhaps calling it "instrumental privacy," or "Fourth Amendment republi-
canism," or "communitarian search and seizure."1 28
Yielding to such a temptation, however, would be unwise because
part of the purpose in developing a constitutional metaphor is to provide
an easily accessible value that can highlight the underlying issues of a
constitutional debate over a particular problem. Republicanism and
communitarian schools of thought undoubtedly can help explicate why
such values are or should be important to American constitutional
thought. If the more immediate purpose, however, is to highlight for the
public as well as the legal community why certain developments are of
Fourth Amendment concern beyond their impact on privacy, then it is
the basic value of trust that best captures what is at stake and that can best
influence future Fourth Amendment dialogue.
Advocating government-citizen trust as a guiding metaphor of the
Fourth Amendment also is vulnerable to the criticism that it reflects an
unrealistic world view: the concept of trust seems to offer little assistance
to the police officer confronted late at night with a dangerous-looking
individual or to a neighborhood overrun with drug dealers. One is re-
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by
reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of
some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings
and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of
hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and
before which even well settled principles of law will bend.
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The challenge, though, as evidenced by the fact that the above quotations are all from
dissenting opinions, is in articulating the long-term interests such that they are accounted
for in the Court's constitutional decisionmaking.
127. Technically, the idea of government-citizen trust is more accurately described as
a metonymy-using one concept to stand for another-rather than as a metaphor. See
generally Haig Bosmajian, Metaphor and Reason in Judicial Opinions 144-45 (1992)
(discussing differences between metaphor and metonymy).
128. I am not sure what each of these would fully connote, but they do sound
scholarly. Indeed, for those of a philosophical bent, one could call it an "Hegelian Fourth
Amendment," given that the approach's underlying principle of trust and recognition has




minded of the Supreme Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit's ruling that
the constitutional guarantee of a right to counsel includes the right to a
"meaningful attorney-client relationship," italicizing the Ninth Circuit's
phrase several times in the opinion, as if to scold the lower court
for trying to bring "I'm OK, you're OK" pop psychology into judicial
decisionmaking.
129
One must keep in mind, however, the metaphor's purpose in this
context. Using trust as one of the Fourth Amendment's driving princi-
ples is not meant to be a specific rule of police behavior to be carried
around with the officer's Miranda card. Rather, the metaphor helps
frame the debate over Fourth Amendment issues in a way that keeps deci-
sions from devolving into what appear to be only disagreements over fac-
tual privacy issues, such as the frequency of use of navigational airspace at
different altitudes.' 30 By casting the issues in a broader context of the
relationship between government and citizen, the implications of a par-
ticular ruling can be ferreted out.
This broadening of perspective is especially crucial because Fourth
Amendment issues increasingly do not concern unexpected police-sus-
pect street encounters where the police need fast and ready rules, but
involve searches and seizures based on a preexisting legislative or admin-
istrative plan.131 Employee drug-testing, sobriety checkpoints, immigra-
tion roadblocks, "factory surveys," flyovers, inventory searches, and safety
inspections are all examples of ongoing government programs based on
reviewable rules and standards, rather than of unanticipated police-indi-
vidual encounters.13 2 These types of government intrusions create a par-
129. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 10, 13 (1983). The majority continued, "No
authority was cited for this novel ingredient of the Sixth Amendment..., and of course
none could be. No court could possibly guarantee that a defendant will develop the kind
of rapport with his attorney ... that the Court of Appeals thought part of the Sixth
Amendment." Id. at 13-14.
130. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-52 & n.2 (1989) (speculating on
number of helicopter flights in Pasco County); id. at 454-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(same).
131. Professor Amsterdam suggested that the value judgment of whether a search
impermissibly curtails freedom consistent with a free society "is a perfectly impossible
question for the Supreme Court to put forth as a test of fourth amendment coverage...
because, in the first and most important instance, the fourth amendment speaks to the
police and must speak to them intelligibly." Amsterdam, supra note 65, at 403. The types
of searches and seizures that are the primary concern of this Article, in contrast, are not
the classic unexpected street police-citizen encounters but part of a plan or program that
easily could be reviewed in advance. See also Mitchell, supra note 27, at 46 (arguing that
"planned programs of governmental intrusions" could be judicially reviewed in light of
their relationship to a proposed "basic vision of America" standard).
132. The benign label of 'administrative search' is used to describe many of these
intrusions, but they have great potential for abuse if the government is allowed to
piggyback nonadministrative objectives on top of them. See United States v. Soyland, 3
F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that court should look at whether Border Patrol was using administrative searches
for illegal aliens as vehicle for also conducting searches for drugs).
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ticularly fertile opportunity for a reviewing court to articulate Fourth
Amendment principles that are not shaped by exigency concerns, but,
instead, allow a reasoned assessment of an ongoing governmental scheme
of intrusions. In this sense, Fourth Amendment judicial review likely
would resemble a court's First Amendment review of hate speech
codes' 33 or government restrictions on a convicted criminal's account of
his exploits.'
34
It is the need for the Fourth Amendment to respond to these "initia-
tory intrusions"-those situations where the government is initiating the
intrusion rather than responding to some suspicious behavior by the indi-
vidual (i.e., a "responsive intrusion") '3 5-that most persuasively supports
adoption of the trust metaphor. For as the Court's Fourth Amendment
pronouncements increasingly have moved outside the classic "cops and
robbers" fact pattern and into the public policy arena, so have the
Amendment's implications for government-citizen relations. And once it
is recognized that the Court's decisions in these "new" search and seizure
cases have far-reaching effects beyond simply addressing impingements
on privacy, a "new" Fourth Amendment can be fashioned that will ac-
count for the broader value of. government-citizen trust which is in the
balance. Ultimately, the message that must be conveyed is that the
Fourth Amendment is not just for the criminally accused anymore, but is
a civil right that affects us all. If no adjustment is made, approval of gov-
ernment intrusions will continue out of short-term concerns without ac-
knowledgement that the constitutional weave is being altered in a funda-
mental way.
D. The Metaphor at Work: Searches, Seizures, and Reasonableness
The ultimate question, of course, is how government-citizen trust
might operate in practice as an animating principle of the Fourth
Amendment. One might again turn to the First Amendment, the
motherlode of legal metaphors, 3 6 to obtain some sense of how the pro-
cess might work. As with metaphors like "the wall of separation" between
church and state or "the marketplace of ideas," the result usually is not to
create a new legal test for the courts to apply, but to establish a starting
point that reflects the basic values at stake. "The wall of separation" be-
tween church and state, for instance, does not by itself resolve specific
issues of government entanglement in religious affairs. To the extent it
133. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 868 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(invalidating university rule prohibiting certain types of stigmatizing speech).
134. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.Ct. 501 (1991)
(invalidating statute requiring publishing proceeds from convicted person's account of
crime to be used to compensate victims).
135. See Sundby, supra note 2, at 418-21 (proposing model of Fourth Amendment
based on whether intrusion is initiatory or responsive).
136. See Bosmajian, supra note 127, at 49-198 (devoting final seven chapters of
discussion of legal metaphors almost entirely to First Amendment metaphors).
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remains a central image, though, it begins Establishment Clause debates
with a general presumption of wariness about state involvement in reli-
gious matters, 137 a wariness that not only will affect the tenor of the legal
system's inquiry, but also will shape the public's perception of what issues
are at stake in the larger arena of public debate.
Similarly, incorporating a government-citizen trust metaphor into
Fourth Amendment doctrine would not take on the shape of a formal-
ized legal factor or test, but would strengthen the currentjudicial analysis
by liberating it from an analysis that focuses on privacy and
reasonableness primarily in terms of physical intrusiveness. The pro-
posed metaphor would serve as a starting point, extending the analysis to
recognize concerns of citizen trust and government legitimacy. As with
any new approach, several criticisms are possible. However, an explana-
tion of how the metaphor would function in practice demonstrates the
comparative strength of a revised doctrine.
Perhaps it is instructive that the Justice who first framed the reason-
able expectation of privacy test, Justice Harlan, later objected to the
Court's "substitution of words for analysis .... Since it is the task of the
law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as
judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the
desirability of saddling them upon society." 138 Justice Harlan, however,
did not propose a more precise expression of his concerns beyond stating
that the Court should ask whether the intrusion is consistent with "our
system of government, as reflected in the Constitution." a39 The following
look at the Court's reasonable expectation of privacy analysis suggests
that the metaphor of reciprocal government-citizen trust might help the
Court escape Justice Harlan's criticism of substituting words for analysis.
1. Deciding When the Amendment Applies: Why Garbage Matters. - In
the ensuing quarter of a century since adoption of the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test, the Court has attempted to decide whether and to
what degree a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a wide variety of
situations, ranging from secret agents to urine samples to hovering heli-
copters. In these cases, the Court gives the appearance of proceeding on
the assumption that the inquiry is merely a factual issue to be determined
objectively from the evidence. Hence, whether or not a helicopter hover-
137. See generally id. at 73-94 (discussing how wall metaphor has affected judicial
debate over Establishment Clause issues). Even where the wall has been attacked as an
inappropriate metaphor for Establishment Clause decisions, it has served as a common
basis for discussion of what the proper role of the First Amendment should be in
regulating state-religion intertwinement. See, e.g., Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106-07
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that "wall of separation" metaphor should
be "frankly and explicitly abandoned"); see also Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the
Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 555, 555-56 (1991) (attacking wall metaphor as "an image untrue to both life
and law" that has led to distorted view of religion clauses).
138. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
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ing at 400 feet violates a reasonable expectation of privacy is viewed as an
"empirical" question to be resolved by debating FAA regulations, fre-
quency of overflights, and other factors.' 40 Lost to express discussion are
the profound policy implications for government-citizen relations that in-
here in whether the police can deliberately take a helicopter and hover
over one's backyard. 141 One finds the plurality treating the case almost as
if it were a property nuisance question, focusing on factors such as
whether the helicopter blades created "undue noise, . . .wind, dust, or
threat of injury."
142
Indeed, the Court's opinions in this area often have an air of unreal-
ity to them. In trying to resolve the "factual" issue of whether a reason-
able expectation of privacy exists, one finds the Court hypothesizing po-
licemen peering over fences as they ride atop double-decker buses,
143
turning to Blackstone's definitions of what constitutes a curtilage, 44 de-
bating whether an aerial camera was powerful enough to discern small
items like a class ring dropped in the snow,145 discussing "the role a barn
plays in rural life," 146 and discoursing on public mores concerning the act
of urination.147 This factual myopia would be entertaining if it were not
for the larger policy questions that the Court is ignoring or, more likely,
addressing only indirectly by using the factual privacy inquiry as its proxy.
To see just how far afield the Court has strayed, it is instructive to
imagine compiling the Court's holdings concerning when the Fourth
Amendment applies or, more accurately, does not apply into an "Acciden-
tal Tourist's Guide to Maintaining Privacy Against Government Surveil-
lance. "148 The advice would be rather astonishing:
To maintain privacy, one must not write any checks nor make
any phone calls. It would be unwise to engage in conversation
with any other person, or to walk, even on private property,
outside one's house. If one is to barbecue or read in the back-
140. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (resolving question of
whether individual has reasonable expectation of privacy from police overflights of
backyard by deciding who bore burden of proof on frequency of nonpolice helicopter
flights at altitude of 400 feet).
141. Justice Brennan did conclude his Riley dissent by observing that the police
surveillance technique under debate-helicopter flyovers-was one of the methods
described in George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four. See id. at 466-67 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
142. Id. at 452.
143. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). In a case set in Santa Clara,
California, ChiefJustice Burger suggested that, despite a 10 foot fence, the defendant may
not have had a subjective expectation of privacy because the backyard still would have been
observable by "a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus."
Id.
144. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 n.3 (1987).
145. Compare Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986) with id.
at 243 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
148. With apologies to Anne Tyler, The Accidental Tourist (1985).
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yard, do so only if surrounded by a fence higher than a double-
decker bus and while sitting beneath an opaque awning. The
wise individual might also consider purchasing anti-aerial spying
devices if available (be sure to check the latest Sharper Image
catalogue). Upon retiring inside, be sure to pull the shades to-
gether tightly so that no crack exists and to converse only in
quiet tones. When discarding letters or other delicate materials,
do so only after a thorough shredding of the documents (again
see your Sharper Image catalogue); ideally, one would take the
trash personally to the disposal site and bury it deep within. Fi-
nally, when buying items, carefully inspect them for any elec-
tronic tracking devices that may be attached.
149
The Court's decisions finding such a limited reasonable expectation
of privacy in society, an expectation so limited that Justice Powell was
moved in exasperation to state that "families can expect to be free of
official surveillance only when they retreat behind the walls of their
homes,"' 50 might be explained by several factors. Perhaps privacy intru-
sions have become so great that a majority of the Justices is factually cor-
rect in holding that the citizenry reasonably does not expect, even if it
might have the desire, to be free from surveillance while walking in the
woods or driving the city streets. 151 Maybe the Court is influenced by the
fact that the privacy interests they are examining in these cases are not
149. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding no legitimate privacy
interest exists in garbage left on curbside); Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 227 (holding that use
of sophisticated aerial mapping camera does not implicate Fourth Amendment);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that no legitimate privacy interest exists
against aerial surveillance of fenced-in backyard); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170
(1984) (holding that no legitimate privacy expectation exists in private property outside
curtilage); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that no interference with
legitimate privacy interest exists where police monitored electronic signals from beeper
located inside car); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that no legitimate
privacy interest exists in numbers dialed from one's phone); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that no legitimate privacy interest exists in microfilm copies of
checks); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (holding that no legitimate privacy
interest exists in conversations that are electronically recorded by undercover police).
150. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 225 n.10 (Powell,J., dissenting). Even retreating inside may
not be sufficient as illustrated by the particularly alarming case of Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d
623, 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), where police with a store-purchased scanning device
monitored cordless phone calls from an apartment complex "hoping to come across some
kind of illegal activity." Id. at 624. Although the state court was able to invalidate the
behavior based on a state privacy right basis, the court noted that such behavior might
escape Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See id. at 631-34 (finding state privacy right broader
than Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir.
1992) ("If, as some experts predict, we are moving inexorably toward a complete cordless
telephone system, the decision as to whether cordless telephone conversations are
protected by the Fourth Amendment may ultimately determine whether any telephone
conversation is protected by the Fourth Amendment.").
151. A recent study by Professors Slobogin and Schumacher, however, strongly
suggests that, as an empirical matter, the Court's decisions often are not in accord with
public perceptions. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look
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those of Farmer McGregor raising corn in the back forty or tending
sheep in the barn, but involve activities like the cultivation of marijuana
and the running of an amphetamine laboratory. 152 Or it is possible that
in deciding what a "reasonable" expectation of privacy is, the Court is
defining reasonableness to include the need for effective law
enforcement.
153
Whatever the reasons behind the Court's holdings, it is worthwhile
to ask whether the quarrel is best directed not at the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test itself, but at what the test does not address.
The real shock in reading the cases is not the realization that an airplane
flying overhead might allow glimpses into the privacy of one's backyard,
but that the Court has found that a police decision to spy on one's back-
yard from an aircraft absent any suspicion is outside the Fourth
Amendment altogether. 5 4 And this is the Katz test's failure as currently
used: it does not require consideration of the consequences if the Court
concludes that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, namely, that
power is being given to the government to engage in an activity unre-
strained by notions of probable cause or even reasonableness.
1' 5
In contrast, if the reasonableness of society's expectations were also
seen as including a concern for government-citizen trust, the Court
might not become bogged down in questions of how much wind and dust
a helicopter churns up hovering at 400 feet. Rather, the Court would
have to address the crucial question lurking behind the privacy rhetoric:
is the government's action inconsistent with trusting the citizenry to be-
have in a lawful and responsible fashion? If the reply is affirmative, then
the intrusion should only be allowed if it can satisfy the Fourth
Amendment's requirements under the Warrant or Reasonableness
Clauses.
The difference in approach can be seen by examining California v.
Greenwood,'5 6 where the Court found that no reasonable expectation of
at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 Duke LJ. 727, 740-42
(1993).
152. Tracey Maclin has argued that the Court, "if pushed," would acknowledge
legitimate privacy interests in many cases; however, "[t]he Court assumes that these
intrusions will only happen to individuals [engaged in criminal activity]. Thus, a majority
of the Court trusts the police to target the 'right' people." Tracey Macliun, Justice
Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 723, 745
(1992).
153. See Bookspan, supra note 2, at 495 (attributing "definitional limitations" on what
constitutes search in part to "a desire to allow more aggressive police investigative methods
to root out crime").
154. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's use of
Katz test for "fail [ing] to acknowledge the qualitative difference between police surveillance
and other uses made of the airspace").
155. Professor Mitchell refers to this failure as the problem of the Court's not
"contextualizing" the meaning of Katz in the broader context of "some basic vision of
America." See Mitchell, supra note 27, at 40-47.
156. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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privacy exists in garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of the
home. Viewed from a privacy angle, the case almost seems silly. Do I
have a great privacy interest in the Hefty bag full of fruit rinds and coffee
grinds that I groggily haul out in the early morning, stubbing my toe on
the curbside in the process? Of course not, and just asking the question
would seem to provide the answer.
It may be surprising, therefore, to learn in what detailed fashion the
Court grappled with the issue. The majority felt compelled to depict a
world where no garbage bag is safe, heavily footnoting how "animals, chil-
dren, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public" have gained
access to garbage in the past.157 The majority also later made reference
to what vaguely sounds like an explanation of a contractual relationship
between garbagor and garbagee.158 Not to be outdone, the dissent at
one point personified the noble Hefty trash bag, finding it able to "tes-
tif[y] eloquently to the eating, reading, and recreational habits of the per-
son who produced it."159
After reading Greenwood, one cannot help but feel that the Court did
not engage in a vigorous debate over "a right of privacy in trash" because
it truly was concerned about the homeowner's expectations upon depos-
iting the trash can at the curb. Rather, a far more important principle
was at stake, but the Katz test as it was being used was unable to ferret it
out. As a result, the Court was led into a surreal discussion over the im-
portance of trash to American society.
This indirect attempt to resolve the most important principle of the
case would not be necessary if the issue were debated with the added
element of government-citizen trust. Instead of speculating about ani-
mals and scavengers getting into trash cans, the Court would confront
directly the much larger and more important question of whether gov-
ernment agents going through trash cans looking for evidence of wrong-
doing is consistent with a constitutional system based on government-citi-
zen trust.
Approached from this perspective, the answer might be quite differ-
ent. Imagine, for example, if someone returned from an overseas visit
and told of how government officials regularly examined the contents of
trash cans to maintain control over the citizenry. Most people would re-
act strongly to such government behavior, but not because the individual
has an overarching privacy interest in his or her garbage. The reaction
would arise because of what is revealed about the government-citizen re-
lationship where the government has the power to engage in an intrusion
like the searching of one's garbage without any need tojustify its actions.
157. See id. at 40 & nn.2-4.
158. See id. at 40 ("Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the
express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself
have sorted through respondents' trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so.").
159. Id. at 50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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This example is not to suggest that the sifting through of Mr.
Greenwood's trash is but one short step from totalitarianism, but rather
that broader values are at stake when the Court says that such searches in
the future need never be justified under the Fourth Amendment. The
government may very well have a compelling and legitimate justification
for its actions far different from a desire to spy on the populace, but that
justification should be examined in the light of a broader Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Without such a perspective, the Court's message is
that whatever an intrusion's connotations for the government's trust of a
citizen, the intrusion need not be justified so long as it does not unduly
impinge upon one's physical privacy. The early morning banging of the
trash cans becomes the same whether one looks out the window and sees
a bored sanitation worker or a police officer searching for criminal evi-
dence. Does the Fourth Amendment really not see the difference?
2. Seizures and the Right to Locomotion: Identfying Reasonable People. -
For similar reasons, the metaphor of government-citizen trust would
bring far more candor to the Court's inquiries concerning whether a
"seizure" sufficient to trigger the Fourth Amendment's protections has
occurred. The Court's current approach is to ask whether "taking into
account all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police
conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was
not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his busi-
ness.' "160 As reasonable as the reasonable person test might sound in the
abstract, the Court's implementation has suffered from an unreality simi-
lar to that of the reasonable expectations of privacy test.
Under current judicial decisions, our Accidental Tourist's guidebook
would have to warn:
Travel is a considerable problem. One should be aware that law
enforcement officers may stop someone and ask permission to
look in his luggage even if the traveler has not acted in a fashion
that would provoke articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. This is
true whether traveling by land, air, or sea. If approached, the
innocent traveler should not be alarmed but should state to the
officer that he or she has no desire to converse and has other,
more important appointments to keep. Although this might
strike the traveler at first as rude and abrupt, and perhaps a bit
frightening if the questioner is armed, the Supreme Court has
made clear that the Fourth Amendment is not for the timid.
Consequently, the wise traveler should carry a copy of the
Fourth Amendment and display it to the questioner and thus
avoid any unnecessary discourse. It is this writer's fervent hope
that travel agents soon shall issue copies of the Fourth
160. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut,
486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)).
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Amendment as standard procedure when writing airplane, bus,
or train tickets.
161
An optimist who reads the Supreme Court's decisions finding that
no seizure had occurred might focus on the inherent courage to stand up
to authority that the Court presupposes in the citizenry. A passenger
seated on a bus that is about to depart, for instance, apparently is suffi-
ciently steeped in constitutional courage that he is capable of telling gun-
toting police who have singled him out for questioning that he wishes to
be left alone.162 Likewise, the American pioneer's anti-authoritarian
spirit presumably has become so ingrained that workers as reasonable
persons will feel free not to cooperate as they watch a large number of law
enforcement agents conduct a surprise "survey" at their factory. The sur-
vey, incidentally, involved agents blocking the exits, asking pointed ques-
tions as they systematically moved down the aisles, handcuffing those they
suspected of being illegal aliens, and then leading them away to waiting
vans. 16
3
Like the expectation of privacy cases, the Court is able to reach these
conclusions by treating the reasonable person's reactions as a factual
question. And, as with the expectation cases, the majority's "factual find-
ings" often seem oblivious to reality.'6 For example, in the "factory sur-
vey" case, the majority suggested that it was pretty much an ordinary
workday for most workers at the factory despite the sudden appearance of
fifteen to twenty-five law enforcement agents and the fact, casually noted
by the Court, that "the surveys did cause some disruption, including the
efforts of some workers to hide."
165
The problem with the Court's analysis is not its assessment of the
reasonable person's reaction in these situations, an assessment that would
probably be futile to dispute given that no clear way exists to disprove the
majority's "findings." 166 The mistake is in treating the question primarily
161. See generally Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The
Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1258, 1300 (1990) ("In the
unrealistic world of Mendenhall, the average citizen feels free to ignore a police officer who
has approached her.").
162. Cf. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431-32, 437 (remanding for determination of whether
seizure occurred when uniformed officers boarded bus, approached defendant without
any articulated basis of suspicion, and requested defendant to consent to search).
163. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 210 (1984).
The majority noted without any sense of irony that, "[w]hile the surveys did cause some
disruption, including the 6fforts of some workers to hide, the record also indicates that
workers were not prevented by the agents from moving about the factories." Id. at 218.
164. See id. at 226 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Wihat is
striking about today's decision is its studied air of unreality.").
165. Id. at 218.
166. But cf. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 151, at 738-39 (presenting data on
public's perception of intrusiveness of various police procedures).
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as a factual inquiry rather than as a broader issue implicating the proper
role of the government in conducting "stops" and "surveys."' 67
Freed from imponderable psychological assessments of the reason-
able person's freedom to resist government questioning, the focus prop-
erly turns to how such behavior accords with notions of government-citi-
zen trust.168 The difference in such a changed focus can be seen in how
one looks at the "right to locomotion" and its idea that a citizen should
be free to move about without government interference. As Professor
Tracey Maclin has explained, this traditional right has been seriously
downgraded through the Court's emphasis on privacy because the right
to locomotion is generally exercised in public where one has little privacy
expectation.169 However, if the government triggers the Amendment's
protections by acting in a manner not in accord with trust of the citizen,
then police behavior interfering with the right to locomotion, such as
randomly questioning individuals about criminal behavior or asking to
search luggage, would now require justification under the Amendment's
substantive provisions.
The idea of trust and its relation to the government encounter's pur-
pose might lead to a logical division between different types of en-
counters, as, for example, the New York Court of Appeals has developed
as a matter of state law. "Benign" or "public service" types of inquiries
and generalized "requests for information" by government officials, be-
cause they do not greatly implicate trust of the citizenry, might require
only an "objective, credible reason" to question an individual. 170 But be-
167. Part of the reason for the Court's air of unreality may be that, as with reasonable
expectation of privacy inquiries, the Court is attempting to handle policy questions
indirectly through the veil of a purportedly factual decision. See Maclin, supra note 161, at
1301.
168. One explanation of the difference in opinion between the United States
Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court in Bostick is that the Florida Supreme
Court directly recognized the broader implications of the police practices under scrutiny:
The spectre of American citizens being asked, by badge-wielding police, for
identification, travel papers-in short a raison d'etre-is foreign to any fair
reading of the Constitution, and its guarantee of human liberties. This is not
Hitler's Berlin, nor Stalin's Moscow, nor is it white supremacist South Africa. Yet
in Broward County, Florida, these police officers approach every person on board
buses and trains... and check identification, tickets, ask to search luggage-all
in the name of 'voluntary cooperation' with law enforcement-to the shocking
extent thatjust one officer ... admitted that during the previous nine months,
he, himself, had searched in excess of three thousand bags! In the Court's
opinion, the founders of the Republic would be thunderstruck.
Bostickv. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1158 (Fla. 1989) (quoting State v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d 347
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)), rev'd sub nom. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
169. See Maclin, supra note 161, at 1328-30.
170. See People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 571-72 (N.Y. 1976) (requiring at least
"some objective credible reason" for "minimal intrusion of approaching [an individual) to
request information"); People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204,212 (N.Y. 1992) (reaffirming De
Bour as a matter of state law, despite contrary U.S. Supreme Court holdings, as necessary
"to protect the individual from arbitrary or intimidating police conduct").
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cause a more intensive stop focusing on an individual's potential crimi-
nality-such as a request to search an individual's luggage-directly im-
plicates trust concerns, it might be justified only if reasonable suspicion
existed.
Whatever form the substantive scheme might eventually take, the key
improvement would be that the Court would directly address the policy
implications of whether a government intrusion is within the
Amendment's scope. Courts would still give considerable leeway to po-
lice-citizen encounters to accommodate the wide variety of police func-
tions that exist beyond investigating crime, but government actions di-
rected at investigating whether an individual has not obeyed the law now
would be firmly within the Fourth Amendment's fold. The question
would then arise as to what the government must demonstrate to justify
the intrusion.
3. Choosing Between the Warrant and Reasonableness Clauses and Deter-
mining Reasonableness. - The final significant impact of introducing gov-
ernment-citizen trust as a defining value would be in influencing how the
Fourth Amendment's provisions operate once a court finds that the
Amendment applies. The Court currently has developed a framework
that consists of two steps. First, it decides whether to analyze an intrusion
under the Warrant or Reasonableness Clause. The Court has struggled to
find the proper fulcrum between the two clauses, but currently asks
whether a "special governmental need" exists that justifies departure
from the Warrant Clause. 171 Once the proper clause is selected, the
Court then engages in the corresponding analysis, looking either under
the Warrant Clause at whether a warrant based upon probable cause was
obtained and whether any exceptions exist, or, if under the
Reasonableness Clause, whether the intrusion was reasonable after weigh-
ing the individual's privacy interests against the government's need to
intrude.172 Crucial to both steps of the inquiry, therefore, is how one
assesses the government's proposed need for the intrusion. The need
will be used both to justify departure from the Warrant Clause and to
argue that the intrusion is reasonable.
Despite its stated preference for the Warrant Clause, the Court has
been quick to find a "special need"justifying departure.' 73 Such willing-
ness to find a "need" might not be too surprising if one considers the
magnitude of the social problems that the government can place on its
171. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66
(1989).
172. See generally supra Part I. If the search is deemed "administrative," the analysis
technically remains within the Warrant Clause. The analysis is basically the same as under
the Reasonableness Clause, however, because the Court defines probable cause for such
searches by using the reasonableness balancing test. See supra notes 54-56 and
accompanying text. Some "pure" administrative searches, however, may be less troubling if
they are not focused on uncovering wrongdoing. See infra note 188.
173. See generally Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 639-40
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (tracing expansion of "special needs" test by Court).
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side of the ledger. How can anyone possibly discount the importance of
the war on drugs,174 the integrity of the educational system, 175 or the
saving of lives?' 76 With a little imagination, even the lowly Vehicle Identi-
fication Number can be made to sound as if it is crucial to civilized
society.1
77
Missing in the Court's consideration of the "special need" to move
from the Warrant Clause into the reasonableness analysis, however, is an
express evaluation of how switching clauses also has "special costs." With-
out such express consideration, the move is especially easy since the
reasonableness test still will provide some potential protections for what is
currently the primary focus of the Amendment-privacy. This is true be-
cause the Court's reasonableness analysis expressly takes into account pri-
vacy interests. The Court is thus relieved when choosing between the
clauses from making an all-or-nothing choice between protecting privacy
and allowing the government intrusion.
178
Moreover, because the current focus is on privacy, the Court in as-
sessing the government's "special need" need not attach any special sig-
nificance to the fact that the intrusion, from the citizen's viewpoint, is by
the government rather than a non-government entity. A privacy interest
in giving a urine sample can be diminished by pointing out that provid-
ing such a sample is a common medical procedure.17 9 A privacy interest
in one's backyard can be downplayed by noting that passengers on a com-
174. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668 ("[Illicit narcotics are] one of the greatest problems
affecting the health and welfare of our population.").
175. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) ("Maintaining order in the
classroom has never been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken
particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major
social problems.").
176. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607 (noting fatalities, injuries, and property damage
from train accidents in which alcohol or drug use was contributing cause).
177. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1986) (discussing a number of
"laudable governmental purposes" served by the vehicle identification number, including
the logical deduction that because vehicle identification numbers help identify stolen
autos, and because stolen autos proportionately are involved in greater number of
accidents, "the [vehicle identification number] safeguards not only property but also life
and limb").
178. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 ("On one side of the balance are arrayed the
individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the
government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order.").
179. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626-27 (minimizing intrusiveness of urine testing, noting
that "[t]he sample is also collected in a medical environment .... and is thus not unlike
similar procedures encountered often in the context of a regular physical examination").
How the focus on privacy can blur the private-government distinction also can be seen in
the oral argument of the Von Raab case:
QUESTION [Justice Blackmun]: You surely have had a physical examination.
MS. WILLIAMS [for petitioner]: Yes, indeed, Your Honor.
QUESTION [Justice Blackmun]: Did you find [giving a urine sample] demeaning
in that respect?
MS. WILLIAMS: No, but nobody came into the toilet with me to watch to see
whether this, indeed, was my urine....
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mercial aircraft might glance out of the window while munching on their
peanuts.180 A privacy interest in one's employment space can be lessened
by positing the overbearing boss constantly overseeing one's work or an
office with a steady flow of visitors.' 8 ' Privacy is treated as a unitary con-
cept that is equally invaded whether it be by canine, 182 homeless per-
son,183 tourist,18 4 fellow employee,' 85 or law enforcement agent.
A look beyond privacy, though, reveals that switching to the
Reasonableness Clause from the Warrant Clause does cause the loss of an
important Fourth Amendment value-the special guaranty of traditional
probable cause that an intrusion will take place only where an individ-
ual's actions give rise to a belief that she has breached the trust that she is
law-abiding. Indeed, one way to think of traditional probable cause is as a
constitutional mechanism requiring the government to trust the citi-
zenry: only articulable reasons to believe that the trust has been violated
will justify an intrusion. This quality is lost, of course, when the govern-
ment is allowed to engage in an initiatory intrusion without individual-
ized suspicion: the individual becomes powerless to avoid the intrusion
other than by foregoing what is otherwise a legal activity.' 86
Additionally, relying on government-citizen trust as a defining value
recognizes that a government intrusion has special implications for the
Fourth Amendment. From this perspective, a difference in kind does ex-
ist between voluntarily giving a urine sample for medical purposes and
the government demanding a sample for urinalysis because it wishes to
randomly check whether its citizens are obeying the law. The former
context does not remotely implicate the government-citizen relationship,
whereas in the latter setting, the intrusion's very purpose is the govern-
QUESTION Uustice Blackmun]: Well, I probably am embarrassed because of my
relationship with the medical profession, but I wonder a little bit about this super
sensitivity about blood tests and urine collection.
Landmark Briefs and Arguments, supra note 30, at 813.
180. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) ("Any member of the
public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these
officers observed.").
181. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987) ("[S]ome government
offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is
reasonable."); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984)
(minimizing intrusion of Immigration and Naturalization Service agents by suggesting that
"[o] rdinarily, when people are at work their freedom to move about has been meaningfully
restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement officials, but by the workers' voluntary
obligations to their employers").
182. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 n.2 (1988).
183. See id. at 40 n.3.
184. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
185. See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717-18.
186. In theory, the Court still could conclude upon applying the reasonableness test
that traditional probable cause is required, but has yet to do so in any case where the Court
has found a special need justifying departure from the Warrant Clause.
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ment's assertion of its power over the citizenry to ensure that the law is
not being violated.'
s7
Infusing government-citizen trust into the Fourth Amendment
calculus, therefore, adds an extra dimension to the Court's decision over
which fork to take in the Fourth Amendment road. If probable cause is
understood as a means of effectuating trust of the citizenry, then the gov-
ernment's proffered "special need" that is to substitute for probable
cause (Probable Cause Nutrasweet, if you will) must also account for why
the targeted citizenry cannot be trusted to obey society's rules. This ac-
counting better reflects what the government is requesting when it asks
for relief from the strictures of probable cause-the right to treat a citi-
zen as rule-breaker even in the absence of a fair probability that the citi-
zen is not obeying the law.
Looked at in this light, a court's reasonableness determination nor-
mally would require two findings beyond the current inquiry.'8 8 First,
because the starting presumption would be that the citizenry should be
trusted absent evidence of wrongdoing, the government would have to
affirmatively prove the existence of a serious problem that justified the
government's breaching its trust to those subjected to the intrusion. For
example, where the government wanted to randomly test employees for
drug use, the burden would be on the government to demonstrate that
187. This point was stressed by the petitioner's counsel in Von Raab in response to a
question suggesting that little difference existed between giving a urine sample during a
doctor's visit and giving a government mandated sample in a controlled setting.
MS. WILLIAMS: Well, I think my clients . . . who are standing before this
collection site do not confuse what they are about to do with a visit to the doctor.
It is not the same. The atmosphere is an adversarial, punitive atmosphere. It is
not a trusting, confidential one that we have come to expect in a visit to the
doctor which is the most these employees would ever have to do for their
employer in a fairly limited way.
Landmark Briefs and Arguments, supra note 30, at 814; see also O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 730
(Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting idea that frequent entries of fellow employees or boss
vitiates Fourth Amendment protections). According to Justice Scalia,
It is privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment, not solitude. A man
enjoys Fourth Amendment protection in his home, for example, even though his
wife and children have the run of the place-and indeed, even though his
landlord has the right to conduct unannounced inspections at any time.
Id.; see also Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting) (objecting that "the Court fails
to acknowledge the qualitative difference between police surveillance and other uses made
of the airspace"); Mitchell, supra note 27, at 41-42, 50-51 (arguing for recognition that
government searches have a special quality because they impinge upon one's sense of
personal security).
188. Where the proposed intrusion did not greatly implicate trust concerns (like a
housing inspection), the Court might retain the current inquiry's focus on privacy. The
primary area of concern for the proposed greater scrutiny is where the underlying
government purpose is to ferret out wrongdoing. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.
691, 716 (1987) (administrative inspection ultimately aimed at uncovering criminal selling
of stolen auto); see also Sitz v. Department of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 224 (Mich.
1993) (distinguishing between administrative searches and those "with the primary goal of
enforcing the criminal law").
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an actual problem existed thatjustified requiring the intrusion's subjects
to forfeit their right to be trusted. Asked in this fashion, the Court could
not, as it did in National Treasuy Employees Union v. Von Raab, simply point
to a general societal problem with drugs and claim a symbolic need for
the testing of Customs agents although no evidence existed that the
targeted group was engaged in drug use.18 9
Second, because probable cause would now be understood as a
means of protecting the citizenry's right to be trusted, the government
also would have to show as part of its special need why reliance on prob-
able cause would defeat its purposes.' 90 The Court's present approach
approximates a loose rational basis standard: if the intrusion arguably
advances the government interest, the Court will not second-guess the
government's judgment. Consequently, in cases like Von Raab and
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the majority was willing to ap-
prove the challenged suspicionless intrusions even though they had little
noticeable impact on the societal problem beyond that which conven-
tional reliance on individualized suspicion had produced, and perhaps
had even been counterproductive.' 9 1
But if trust is used as a guiding value, then the deference should not
be to the government's judgment as to the "need" for the particular in-
trusion, but to the Constitution's judgment that the citizenry is to be
trusted to act in an informed and responsible manner. The burden of
justification would rest with the government to show that the intrusion
substantially furthered the government's goal beyond conventional en-
forcement means. After all, if the justification in foregoing probable
cause is that reliance on trust would defeat the attainment of a compel-
ling government interest, the justification falls away if the alternative is no
189. See generally National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
683 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stressing that government not only had failed to
produce evidence of drug abuse by Customs agents, but had not cited "even a single instance
in which any of the speculated horribles actually occurred" (emphasis in original)); see
also Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 477 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), (arguing that lack of proof regarding efficacy of sobriety checkpoints led to
conclusion that "[t]his is a case that is driven by nothing more than symbolic state action-
an insufficient justification for an otherwise unreasonable program of random seizures").
190. This inquiry should not be confused with whether reliance on probable cause
would make achievement of the goal more difficult, for "the Amendment plainly operates
to disable the government from gathering information and securing evidence in certain
ways." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 941 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Rather,
the inquiry should focus on where preventive measures, such as housing inspections or
airport weapons screening, are the only effective means available to avert immediate
dangers to the public. See generally Sundby, supra note 2, at 444-46.
191. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674-75 ("The mere circumstance that all but a few of
the employees tested are entirely innocent... does not impugn the program's validity....
Where... the possible harm.., is substantial, the need to prevent its occurrence furnishes
an ample justification for reasonable searches calculated to advance the ... goal."); see
also Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54. In Sitz, the dissent noted the existence of statistical evidence
which suggested that the net effect of sobriety checkpoints on traffic safety was
"infinitesimal and possibly negative." 496 U.S. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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more effective.' 9 2 Similarly, a proposed intrusion's slight impact on pri-
vacy no longer could be used to help justify an intrusion on less than
probable cause because the degree of privacy invasion would become rel-
evant only after the government had proved that waiting for probable
cause to develop entailed an unacceptable risk.
198
Although perhaps coming from a surprising quarter of the law for a
Fourth Amendment argument, the Court's recent Takings Clause case,
Dolan v. City of Tigard,194 is instructive on the difference that such a view
of the government's evidentiary obligation can make. The issue in Dolan
was the proper standard of review to determine when conditions placed
upon a landowner who wishes to make improvements amount to an un-
constitutional taking. The Court rejected a "reasonable relationship" test
because it "seems confusingly similar to the term 'rational basis' which
describes the minimal level of scrutiny," 95 and instead adopted a stan-
dard that required "the city [to] make some sort of individualized deter-
mination that the required dedication is related both in nature and ex-
tent to the impact of the proposed development."' 96 The Court refused
to defer to the city's general findings that the petitioner's commercial
expansion would create more traffic and thus would justify requiring the
petitioner to build a bike path. Instead, it reversed because " '[t]he find-
ings of fact that the bicycle pathway system "could offset some of the traffic
demand" is a far cry from a finding that the bicycle pathway system will,
or is likely to, offset some of the traffic demand.' ... [T]he city must make
some effort to quantify its findings .... ,,197
A comparison of Dolan to cases like Von Raab or Sitz might lead us to
ask why the Court demands from the government a more exacting empir-
192. At a minimum, any intrusions outside the proven justification-such as
searching for drugs during an immigration check-would not be allowed because the
added dimension of the intrusion would lack the underlying findings for abandonment of
individualized suspicion. See United States v. Soyand, 3 F.3d 1312, 1315-20 (9th Cir.
1993) (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that court should
examine whether immigration officials were exceeding proper bounds of searches for
illegal aliens); cf. United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1247 (9th Cir.
1989) (striking down program rewarding airport security agents for finding drugs and
money because program "effectively transform[ed] a limited check for weapons and
explosives into a general search for evidence of crime").
193. Under the Court's current approach, the brevity of an intrusion is itself a factor
that may help tojustify the search. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 ("[T]he weight bearing on the
[individual's side of the] scale-the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly
at sobriety checkpoints-is slight.").
194. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
195. Id. at 2319.
196. Id. at 2319-20.
197. Id. at 2322 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 447 (Or. 1993)
(dissenting opinion) (quoting City of Tigard Planning Comm'n Final Order No. 91-09 PC
at 24 (1991))). Using a similar rationale, the Court also struck down the city's claim of a
recreational easement along the floodbasin part of the petitioner's land. The Court found
the city had not shown a "reasonable relationship" between the easement and the
increased runoff that the petitioner's new building would create. See id. at 2321.
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ical showing to justify the building of a bike path on private commercial
property than to justify a program of blanket suspicionless searches and
seizures of individuals.198 Nor is the comparison completely lacking in
irony, as the Dolan majority's justification for a heightened standard of
review was that it "saw no reason why the Takings Clause..., as much a
part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment,
should be relegated to the status of a poor relation."199 After Dolan, the
Fourth Amendment arguably is now the poor relation who longingly eyes
the evidentiary neighborhood where the Takings Clause lives.
In the end, what is being sought is a Fourth Amendment inquiry
requiring the government to demonstrate either that the citizen has for-
feited her right to be trusted through misbehavior (i.e., through a show-
ing of traditional probable cause), or that, if probable cause is to be dis-
pensed with, trusting the citizenry is simply too costly given the
immediacy and importance of the government interest. A classic exam-
ple of the latter would be weapons screening at airports, which was insti-
tuted in response to a recurring problem with skyjackings. The opportu-
nity to observe passengers for suspicious behavior prior to boarding is
extremely limited, and once in the air, the plane is effectively isolated
from law enforcement personnel. Given these factors, the only realistic
means of preventing a serious danger to passenger safety is to dispense
with individualized suspicion and screen all passengers for weapons.
200
Adding trust into the Fourth Amendment equation would not eliminate
intrusions based on less than probable cause, but it would make clear that
the burden rests with the government to demonstrate affirmatively why
the presumption of trust should not apply.
4. Who Should Decide: The Role ofJudges, Juries, and Legislators. - An
emphasis on reciprocal government-citizen trust would revitalize the
probable cause requirement as the centerpiece of the Amendment's pro-
tections. Because the starting assumption is that the citizen is to be
trusted unless the government shows otherwise, the notion of what is rea-
sonable becomes intertwined with the idea of individualized suspicion.
The approach also would reinforce the Court's oft-stated preference for
prior judicial review, since the goal would be to preclude the intrusion
until the government has provided satisfactory justification. But a ques-
tion remains: is such a reemphasis on the Court's traditional Warrant
Clause preference desirable in light of the Amendment's historical dis-
trust of warrants (because they cloaked their executor with absolute im-
198. The city in fact had made some effort to calculate the increased traffic that the
petitioner's expansion would produce, but the Court found the city had not shown how
these calculations were "reasonabl[y] relate[d]" to the need for the bicycle path easement.
See id.
199. Id. at 2320.
200. See Sundby, supra note 2, at 445-46 (discussing how airport weapons screening
comports with Fourth Amendment values).
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munity from trespass suit) 20 1 and given the flexibility that is gained with a
free-floating reasonableness standard?
In fact, some have argued that we should come full circle by resusci-
tating the colonial understanding that warrants based on probable cause
were a device to be limited and instead rely upon a reasonableness stan-
dard not unlike that used in tort law.20 2 Proponents of this view argue
that not only would adoption of an all-encompassing reasonableness stan-
dard be more in accord with the historical understanding of the Warrant
Clause, but also that it would bring harmony to the Fourth Amendment
by eliminating the need for the Court to adapt the Warrant Clause's re-
quirements to a variety of situations.203 In a recent article, Professor
Akhil Amar has suggested a complete housecleaning, leaving Fourth
Amendment issues to be decided in civil jury trials under a broad
reasonableness standard.2 0 4 This approach, he argues, is in accord with
the historical lesson that "juries, not judges, are the heroes of the Foun-
ders' Fourth Amendment story."
20 5
Apart from the numerous procedural and substantive changes that
would be required before such an approach would work,205 past experi-
ence strongly suggests that a generalized one-size-fits-all constitutional
standard does not have the desired settling effect. As the evolution of the
constitutional rules governing confessions and the right to counsel well
201. See Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757,
774 (1994).
202. Although the proposals differ from each other significantly, this basic approach
can be found in Amar, supra note 201, at 800-11 (advocating reliance on civil damages
instead of exclusionary rule); Bradley,*supra note 21, at 1481-91 (discussing how model
based purely on reasonableness would operate); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth
Amendment, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 49, 58 (arguing that exclusionary rule is a less effective
and more costly deterrent device to illegal searches than tort law).
203. See Amar, supra note 201, at 800; Bradley, supra note 21, at 1488.
204. See Amar, supra note 201, at 800. Although much of what follows disagrees with
Professor Amar's solution to Fourth Amendment ills, particularly the use of civil jury trials
to implement the Amendment's protections, I do not intend to take away from his
persuasive highlighting of "the mess." Indeed, his thesis that the Fourth Amendment must
be thought of not as a criminal procedure right but in the context of the whole
Constitution, see id. at 758-60, complements much of this Article's basis for interpreting
the Amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 100-115 (arguing for trust metaphor
based on broader understanding of the Constitution and Bill of Rights).
205. Id. at 771. In an interesting and thoughtful piece focusing on the Fourth
Amendment as a "societal right," Professors Thomas and Pollack also have advocated the
use ofjuries to decide Fourth Amendment violations. See George C. Thomas III & Barry S.
Pollack, Saving Rights From a Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth Amendment, 73 B.U.
L. Rev. 147, 169-80 (1993).
206. Because Professor Amar's reasonableness standard is placed primarily in the
hands of the jury and supplants the exclusionary rule, his proposal requires a host of
changes, including recognizing direct governmental liability, defining how punitive
damages should work, and changing the right to attorney fees where nominal damages are
awarded. See Amar, supra note 201, at 811-16. Because Professor Bradley's reform does




illustrates, a vague standard that must be frequently applied simply cre-
ates too many opportunities for conflicting holdings and eventually gives
rise to a call for more specific rules and guidance. 20 7 Reliance upon jury
verdicts may obscure some of the open conflict, but one can easily imag-
ine inconsistent verdicts soon leading to calls by police, legislatures, and
lower courts for more judicial guidance.
208
But even assuming that such an approach would bring peace and
harmony to Fourth Amendment doctrine, it is necessary to ask whether
the Court's twentieth-century embrace of the Warrant Clause's protec-
tions can be justified as more than an accidental doctrinal U-turn that
should be corrected. As Professor Carol Steiker and others have noted,
the greatest difficulty with relying solely upon a historical view that war-
rants were disfavored is that "[o] ur colonial forebears could not have pre-
dicted the sheer numbers of law enforcement agents at work today, the
breadth of their operational mandate, or their pervasive authoritarian
presence."20 9 Perhaps even more compellingly, the Founders could not
have foreseen the technological and regulatory reach of government in-
trusions that exists today. The government's ability to now conduct large-
scale drug testing of employees and to annually stop millions of vehicles
at immigration checkpoints are but two examples of how administrative
searches allow "government officials [to] routinely invade the privacy and
207. Consider, for example, that the prophylactic rule of Miranda largely resulted
from the ambiguity of the Court's voluntariness test:
Given the Court's inability to articulate a clear and predictable definition of
"voluntariness," the apparent persistence of state courts in utilizing the ambiguity
... to validate confessions of doubtful constitutionality, and the resultant burden
on its own workload, it seemed inevitable that the Court would seek "some
automatic device by which the potential evils of incommunicado interrogation
[could] be controlled."
Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99,
102-03 (quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Suspect and Society 10 (1967)). Likewise, part of the
Court's rationale in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), was that the Court's case-
by-case approach for deciding if the defendant was entitled to counsel had "been a
continuing source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts." Id. at
338. Although placing primary responsibility on the jury may eliminate some of the
confusion, primarily because one would not know the jury's reasoning, Professor Amar
acknowledges that an overarching judicial regime of some Fourth Amendment doctrine
defining reasonableness would be necessary. See Amar, supra note 201, at 817.
208. Professor Amar expressly retains a role for the judiciary to continue "build[ing]
up doctrine," acknowledging that certain cases may involve "unjustified jury insensitivity"
or implicate other constitutional values. See Amar, supra note 201, at 817.
209. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts about First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 820,
830-38 (1994); see also Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 290-94 (commenting on
dramatically different nature of law enforcement during colonial times). Moreover,
although it appears clear that the Warrant Clause's immediate purpose was to curtail the
abuses of the general warrant, Professor Wasserstrom has made a strong argument that a
Warrant Clause preference for all searches is not inconsistent with the broader historical
view of judicial restraints being placed on executive searches and seizures. See id. at
283-94.
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property of countless millions; hardly anyone escapes their clammy
grasp."21
0
Yet, these types of searches would be extremely difficult to give over
to juries under a broad reasonableness standard, because they are not
concrete factual disputes or blatant abuses of power for which juries are
better suited as decisionmakers. The case, for example, that Professor
Amar gives as illustrating the jury as hero is Wilkes v. Wood,211 where the
jury awarded large damages because King George III's ministry issued a
general warrant and undertook a massive search for those who had pub-
lished a pamphlet highly critical of the ministry.212 This is the easy case,
though, where the plaintiff was himself a hero (" 'Wilkes and Liberty' be-
came a rallying cry for all those who hated government oppression"),213
and the government played to perfection the role of the dastardly villain
with the handlebar moustache.
But what of the case where the government behavior is far more sub-
tle or the plaintiff far less appealing? It truly is asking the jury to be he-
roic to expect them to account for overarching constitutional principles
when asked, say, to award damages because an overly eager official tried
to detect drugs beyond whatever "administrative" objective the official
was charged with carrying out.2 1 4 The task becomes Herculean if the jury
also is expected to decide such crucial Fourth Amendment principles
when drugs were actually found.
215
210. United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning whether border patrol was
exceeding its proper mandate by looking for contraband in addition to illegal aliens).
Professor Amar does make the legitimate point that, "[a) broader search is sometimes
better-fairer, more regular, more constitutionally reasonable-if it reduces the
opportunities for official arbitrariness, discretion and discrimination." Amar, supra note
201, at 809. The need to control discretion through procedural regularity, however,
should be reached only once the government has shown the need for the intrusion in the
first place. Allowing procedural regularity to serve as part of the search's justification is in
essence to let the government argue that the need for the intrusion need not be as
compelling because the citizenry can be assured that everyone else is undergoing the same
less-than-compelling intrusion.
211. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763).
212. See Amar, supra note 201, at 772 & n.54.
213. Id. at 772 n.54.
214. See United States v. Santa Maria, 15 F.3d 879, 882 (9th Cir. 1994) (marijuana
improperly found by border patrol agents who searched for drugs because statutory power
was only for preventing entry of illegal aliens); see also Soyland, 3 F.3d at 1316; United
States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 1989) (invalidating
program encouraging airport security personnel to look for contraband other than
weapons).
215. See Steiker, supra note 209, at 850-51 (citing notable examples of juries,
especially if racial issues were involved, that refused to acknowledge police misbehavior).
Given that one of the Court's reasons for adopting the exclusionary rule was the failure of
civil damages as a remedy for police misbehavior, see id. at 849-50, one could predict that
giving these issues to the jury is in effect returning to the common law rule that even a
search on a hunch would be permitted so long as it "proved right-... ex post success
apparently was a complete defense." Amar, supra note 201, at 767.
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At bottom, the difficulties these type of cases would pose for juries
are but one way of raising the more fundamental question of what values
the Fourth Amendment protects. Ajury applying a reasonableness stan-
dard undoubtedly would be able to defend the Fourth Amendment
where the government acts outrageously. But, perhaps, it is the subtle
acts of power and control, rather than the overt displays of government
power, that have the more lasting and pernicious effects on the fabric of
government-citizen relations.216 As Judge Kozinski has colorfully ob-
served, "Liberty-the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by govern-
ment-is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials
who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to op-
press; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark."
217
One is also reminded of Viclav Havel's story of the greengrocer who
is required to place in his window a sign with the slogan, "Workers of the
world, unite!" The sign, which all commercial establishments are re-
quired to put out and to which few pay conscious attention, may be mun-
dane in the greengrocer's everyday life, but Havel powerfully portrays
how isolated mundane acts when taken together create a
panorama that everyone is very much aware of. This panorama,
of course, has a subliminal meaning as well: it reminds people
where they are living and what is expected of them. It tells them
what everyone else is doing, and indicates to them what they
must do as well, if they don't want to be excluded, to fall into
isolation, alienate themselves from society, break the rules of the
game, and risk the loss of their peace and tranquility and
security.21
8
It is this long-term collective influence of what might otherwise ap-
pear to be isolated or mundane events that increasingly is at stake when
government intrusions are approved without probable cause. Asking a
jury in a post hoc setting to identify and apply Fourth Amendment values
that transcend any particular fact pattern is to leave the Amendment's
protections to piecemeal enforcement largely dependent upon the ap-
peal of a particular plaintiff. As with First Amendment cases, where the
disputed speech often is of an unpopular nature, 21 9 the only realistic
prospect for the Fourth Amendment to provide meaningful protection
216. See Sundby, supra note 2, at 439-40 (noting failure of Court to account for
cumulative effect of intrusions).
217. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1246.
218. Vficlav Havel, The Power of the Powerless, in Living in Truth, supra note 89, at
36, 41, 51.
219. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (defendant convicted of
desecrating American flag); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (convicted
defendant was leader of Ku Klux Klan); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (Jehovah's Witness refused to salute American flag).
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against the vast array of government intrusions rests in a judiciary sensi-
tive to both privacy and trust concerns.
2 20
This need to account for broader values is also why heightened in-
dependent judicial review of the government's reasons for a proposed
intrusion is essential rather than deference to the government's judg-
ment of the need for an intrusion. It is tempting to suggest that if a
certain search technique is too oppressive, especially if it involves a group
search such as group drug testing or sobriety checkpoints, 221 the political
process will provide the cure by "throw[ing] the rascals out."222 But one
is less sanguine if it is understood that the very problem with such
searches is that they undermine the informed and free individual partici-
pation upon which "the cure"-the political process-is premised.
223
To use a First Amendment analogy, even with majority support, we
would not allow censorship of a nonobscene book. Whatever the current
majority's view of the book, consensual government requires that each
individual has the right of access to information and differing views.
Likewise with the Fourth Amendment, although a search might have ma-
jority approval, perhaps even majority approval of the group that is being
subjected to the search, 2 24 the search is still individual in that it casts
aside the assumption for that particular member of the group that she is
220. As something of a compromise, Professors Thomas and Pollack argue that the
jury should decide the Fourth Amendment violation issue and the judge should determine
suppression issues. See Thomas & Pollack, supra note 205, at 175; cf. Steiker, supra note
209, at 851 (arguing for exclusionary rule "[flor the same reasons that we have turned to
judges to enforce the anti-majoritarian provisions of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments").
221. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the
Fourth Amendment, supra note 2, at 588 ("The likeliest explanation for giving greater
leeway to group stops is that politics provides an adequate remedy for overzealous police
action; groups of drivers [for example], unlike the solitary suspect, can protect themselves
from overzealous police tactics at the polls.").
222. Id. at 588.
223. This objection is apart from the criticism that some groups will be more effective
than others at using the political process. See id. at 589 (acknowledging that because
"some groups can protect themselves better than others . . . judicial review must be
preserved where there is a high likelihood of impermissible discrimination").
224. Government officials, for example, defended efforts to control crime in low-
income housing projects through random warrantless searches of apartments on the basis
that a majority of housing project tenants supported the measures as a necessary step to
reduce crime. See, e.g., Michael Kramer, Clinton's House Rules, Time, May 9, 1994, at 55.
It is perhaps instructive that after the blanket sweeps were ruled unconstitutional, see Pratt
v. Chicago Housing Authority, 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1994), the government
formulated an approach that was more precisely tailored in its scope yet designed to
reduce gun-related violence. The plan included a greater law enforcement presence,
tenant patrols, searches of vacant apartments and public areas, and consent searches. See
Clinton Administration Outlines Public Housing Search Policy, 55 Crim. L. Rep. 1114
(1994); Lloyd Cutler, Letter to the Editor, Gun Sweeps and Tenants' Rights, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 25, 1994, at A14. Although the response itself was not entirely noncontroversial, see
Tracey Maclin, Public Housing Searches Ignore the Constitution, Christian Sci. Monitor,
May 24, 1994, at 19 (arguing that mandatory consent-to-search lease clauses would be
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an individual who can be trusted to exercise her liberties responsibly.225
And if one accepts the idea that the long-term legitimacy of the govern-
ment is dependent upon all citizens having the belief that the govern-
ment draws its power to govern from their consent, then that belief is
undermined, both symbolically and in very real terms, when the govern-
ment acts in a manner that belies a trust of the citizen to act responsibly.
CONCLUSION: THE COSTS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
This Court has gone far toward accepting the doctrine that
civil liberty means ... that all local attempts to maintain order
are impairments of the liberty of the citizen. The choice is not
between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and
anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the Court does
not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it
will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.
-Justice Robert Jackson
226
Few have captured as vividly as Justice Jackson the tension between
protecting rights and knowing that some will abuse those rights and act
irresponsibly. The First Amendment is the constitutional shelter for pro-
gressive visionaries, but it is also the refuge of those who preach hatred.
And while the Fourth Amendment erects a barrier from government in-
trusion for those who wish to live peacefully, it is also a barrier behind
which the drug smuggler will try to hide. As Justice Jackson suggested,
the question is at what point the short-term danger is so great that it must
take precedence over the right to liberty.
22 7
unconstitutional), the response does demonstrate that barring high-profile blanket
searches may actually encourage a more efficient long-term plan for targeting crime.
225. As Justice O'Connor has observed:
Fourth Amendment rights have at times proved unpopular; it is a measure of the
Framers' fear that a passing majority might find it expedient to compromise
Fourth Amendment values that these values were embodied in the Constitution
itself.... Legislators by virtue of their political role are more often subjected to
the political pressures that may threaten Fourth Amendment values than are
judicial officers.
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365-66 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (objecting to
majority's extension of exclusionary rule's good faith exception to reliance on statutes).
226. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
227. One of the most dramatic portrayals of this tension occurred during the oral
argument in the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971).
THE COURT [justice Stewart]: But let me give you a hypothetical case. Let us
assume that when the members of the Court go back and open up this sealed
record, we find something there that absolutely convinces us that its disclosure
would result in the sentencing to death of 100 young men whose only offense had
been that they were 19 years old, and had low draft numbers. What should we
do?
MR. BICKEL [for the New York Times]: Mr. Justice, I wish there were a statute
that covered it.
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Currently, the answer to that question for the Fourth Amendment is
answered under the rubric of reasonableness, which, as I have argued, is
incompletely measured through -the weights of privacy and the govern-
ment need for the intrusion. The pressing needs of an immediate crisis
almost always will seem tojustify a government intrusion, short of random
full-scale house searches, in light of the privacy invasion. Looked at in
isolation, it is better to have the shoreline of one's island of privacy par-
tially eroded by government surveillance than to have the entire island
overrun by barbarians.
A "suicide pact," however, may arise not only from the inability to
eradicate the short-term danger, but also through -the undermining of
the long-term principles that provide the sustainability of a government
dependent upon the trust of its people.228 Indeed, while Justice Jackson
sounded the haunting warning of enforcing liberties so rigidly that they
become a suicide pact, he also was acutely aware, in part because of his
Nuremberg experiences, of the long-term dangers attendant to not pro-
tecting the citizen's independence from the government. Writing in the
rather mundane context of a search of a bootlegger, Justice Jackson was
led to observe:
[The Fourth Amendment's protections], I protest, are not mere
second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable
THE COURT (justice Stewart]: Well there isn't, we agree-or you submit-so
I'm asking in this case, what should we do?
MR. BICKEL: I'm addressing a case which I am as confident as I can be of
anything, Your Honor will not find that when you get back to your chambers. It's
a hard case. I think it would make bad separation of powers law, but it's almost
impossible to resist the inclination not to let that information be published, of
course.
THE COURT [Justice Stewart]: . .. I'm posing a case where the disclosure of
something in these files would result in the death of people who were guilty of
nothing.
MR. BICKEL: You're posing me a case, of course, Mr. Justice...
.. in which the chain of causation between the act of publication and the feared
event-the death of these 100 young men-is obvious, direct, immediate-
THE COURT [Justice Stewart): That's what I'm assuming in my hypothetical case.
MR BICKEL: I would only say, as to that, that it is a case in which, in the absence
of the statute, I suppose most of us would say-
THE COURT [Justice Stewart]: You would say the Constitution requires that it be
published, and that these men die? Is that it?
MR. BICKEL: No. No, I'm afraid I'd have-I'm afraid my inclinations of
humanity overcome the somewhat more abstract devotion to the First
Amendment, in a case of that sort.
71 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Constitutional Law 239-40 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
228. Cf. P.S. Elder, Sustainability, 36 McGill LJ. 831, 832 (1991) (examining, within
context of environmental law, role of law towards "[meeting] the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (quoting
Our Common Future: The World Commission on Environment and Development 43
(1987))).
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freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in
cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and
putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure
is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of
every arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have
dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many admirable
qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the human
personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear
where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to
unheralded search and seizure by the police.2
29
It is tempting to dismiss Justice Jackson's words as an overwrought
warning that has little place in the United States where, if anything, the
popular view is that the courts have given too much leeway to the crimi-
nal element at the expense of law enforcement. Before engaging in such
a quick dismissal, however, it may be worthwhile to mull over Justice
Jackson's words a bit further.
First, consider whether the law enforcement techniques under scru-
tiny do not have the potential if abused to resemble the archetypal image
of an authoritarian regime that exercises control over the citizenry
through methods such as demands for identification at the police bar-
rier.230 The Supreme Court alone, whose docket reflects but a fraction of
law enforcement activities, has recently had before it cases involving the
random demand for identification papers of workers in their work-
place,231 the random request to search baggage of those traveling on
mass transportation, 232 the random boarding of vessels to demand pa-
pers,233 the random stopping of vehicles at checkpoints to investigate the
violation of immigration laws,23 4 the random stopping of vehicles at
checkpoints to investigate the violation of traffic sobriety laws,23 5 the ran-
dom sniffing of schoolchildren for drugs by police dogs, 23 6 and the drug
testing of federal employees solely because they are seeking promotion or
229. Brinegar v. United States, 388 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (JacksonJ., dissenting).
230. One commentator has strung together the Court's decisions to 'make' an
imaginary World War II propaganda film about an enemy nation where the police are
engaged in the activities that the Court has approved, such as dog sniffs, helicopter
overflights, and the like. See Mitchell, supra note 27, at 35-36.
231. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
232. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). The state courts that had considered
the employed tactics expressly analogized the techniques to those associated with
dictatorial regimes. See supra note 168.
233. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
234. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
235. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
236. See Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981) (Justice Brennan, dissenting from
denial of cert.) (involving assistant principal who, accompanied by police-trained German
shepherd, dog handler, and uniformed police officer, carried out 2 1/2 hour search in
which dogs were led up and down aisles of classrooms sniffing students as they sat at their
desks).
"EVERYMAN" 'S FOURTH AMEADMENT
transfer to certain positions.23 7 If the perspective is expanded beyond
the formalities of the judicial docket to other forums, 238 concerns over
law enforcement-citizen interactions, especially in the minority commu-
nity, become increasingly great.
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As important as any privacy intrusion that may result from these ac-
tivities, however, is the underlying message that is sent when such activi-
ties are given judicial approval: despite the absence of any wrongdoing,
the government may assume that the citizen has violated the law and un-
dertake measures to confirm that assumption. The most basic premise of
reciprocal government-citizen trust is thus turned into a unilateral propo-
sition that the individual citizen must trust the government to use its in-
trusion power wisely, but the government need not reciprocate in its trust
of the individual to obey the law. Fortunately, the government generally
has exercised its growing power in a nonabusive fashion, but the Fourth
Amendment requires that primary control over future use of the power
be placed in the citizenry and not in the government's discretion.
2 40
237. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). This
list logically should also include those cases where, because the Court held that the
government intrusion does not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, the intrusion does not require any suspicion. The list thus would also
include police activities such as flyovers by helicopters and airplanes, the use of pen
registers, inspections of a bank's copies of personal checks, or snooping in someone's
garbage. See supra notes 140-153 and accompanying text.
238. And as Justice Jackson noted in Brinegar v. United States, the courts will confront
only a fraction of all unlawful searches because there will be many law enforcement
intrusions upon "innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest
is made, about which courts do nothing, and about which we never hear." 338 U.S. 160,
181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
239. An ever expanding body of literature, drawing upon both statistical and
anecdotal evidence, has highlighted the tension between police and minority
communities, especially in the area of street encounters. See, e.g., James M. Doyle, "It's
the Third World Down There!": The Colonialist Vocation and the American Criminal
Justice System, 27 Harv. C.R1-C.L. L. Rev. 71 (1992); Elizabeth A. Gaynes, The Urban
CriminalJustice System: Where Young + Black + Male = Probable Cause, 20 Fordham Urb.
LJ. 621, 625 (1993) (discussing patterns and anecdotal evidence of police harassment of
African-American men); Sheri L. Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93
Yale LJ. 214, 224 (1983) (stating that police sometimes assert that suspect's race
contributes to their decision to detain him); Maclin, supra note 152, at 747 n.110 (drawing
upon number of sources to brilliantly show howJustice Scalia's invocation, in California v.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 623 n.1 (1991), of the proverb that "the wicked flee when no man
pursueth" to show that avoidance of police indicates guilt, has little application to black
youth who may have many alternative reasons for avoiding police); Gregory H. Williams,
The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The Gradual but Continual Erosion of Teny v.
Ohio, 34 How. L.J. 567 (1991) (examining how African-Americans are subjected to
widespread warrantless searches and seizures).
240. As the Michigan Supreme Court noted in departing from the United States
Supreme Court's deference to legislative judgment: "[I ] t is not the genius of our system
that the constitutional rights of persons shall depend for their efficacy upon legislative
benevolence. Rather, the courts are charged with the solemn obligation of erecting
around those rights, in adjudicated cases, a barrier against legislative or executive
invasion." Sitz v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 224 (Mich. 1993).
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In a time when violence abounds, arguing in defense of the symbolic
message of the Fourth Amendment may strike some as naive at best and
misguided at worst. But a lesson is being taught when schoolchildren are
subjected to acts such as random searches by drug-sniffing dogs2 41 or
when the very law enforcement agents responsible for enforcing the law
are made to undergo random testing.242 The lesson is that, despite re-
sponsible individual behavior, the government has the power to exercise
its judgment and discard trust of the individual in the name of a per-
ceived greater good. It is this discarding of trust, however, that in the
long run jeopardizes the greater good by upsetting the reciprocal govern-
ment-citizen trust that forms the foundation of a legitimate government.
This principle currently finds little voice in Fourth Amendment analysis,
but, with proper development, it can help forge a safeguard in a chang-
ing world that not only protects individual privacy but also sustains the
government-citizen balance that is the cornerstone for our democracy.
241. See, e.g., Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.). As Justice Stevens perceptively noted in a different case while dissenting
from the possibility of student searches based upon trivial violations of school regulations,
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to experience the
power of government. Through it passes every citizen and public official, from
schoolteachers to policemen and prison guards. The values they learn there, they
take with them in life. One of our most cherished ideals is the one contained in
the Fourth Amendment: that the government may not intrude on the personal
privacy of its citizens without a warrant or compelling circumstance. The Court's
decision today is a curious moral for the Nation's youth.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385-86 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
242. Justice Scalia was acutely aware of the lesson being taught by the majority's
approval of drug testing of customs officials:
Those who lose because of the lack of understanding that begot the present
exercise in symbolism are not just the Customs Service employees, whose dignity
is thus offended, but all of us-who suffer a coarsening of our national manners
that ultimately give the Fourth Amendment its content, and who become subject
to the administration of federal officials whose respect for our privacy can hardly
be greater than the small respect they have been taught to have for their own.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 687 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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